Roger Williams University

DOCS@RWU
Law Faculty Scholarship

Law Faculty Scholarship

11-2015

Justice at War: Military Tribunals and Article III
Peter Margulies
Roger Williams University School of Law, pmargulies@rwu.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://docs.rwu.edu/law_fac_fs
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and
Peace Commons

Recommended Citation
Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals and Article III, 49 U.C.Davis L. Rev. 305, 382 (2015)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Faculty Scholarship at DOCS@RWU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of DOCS@RWU. For more
information, please contact mwu@rwu.edu.

+(,121/,1(
Citation:
Peter Margulies, Justice at War: Military Tribunals and
Article III, 49 U.C.D. L. Rev. 305 (2015)
Provided by:
Roger Williams University School of Law Library
Content downloaded/printed from HeinOnline
Thu Jul 5 16:44:11 2018
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance
of HeinOnline's Terms and Conditions of the license
agreement available at https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from
uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope
of your HeinOnline license, please use:
Copyright Information
Use QR Code reader to send PDF to
your smartphone or tablet device

Justice at War: Military Tribunals
and Article III
Peter Margulies*
The interaction of Article III of the U.S. Constitution and military
tribunals has inspireddebate since the Supreme Court's landmark decision
in Ex parte Milligan. Today, debate swirls around whether Article III bars
military commissions from trying suspected terrorists on charges of
inchoate conspiracy. That debate rages against the backdrop of the thorny
jurisprudence on non-Article III tribunals generally, which Chief Justice
Roberts recently acknowledged has failed to provide "sufficient guidance."
The military commission debate and a parallel conversation about
courts-martial and Article III pit a protective camp against a functional
approach. The protective camp, driven by classic opinions by Justices
Brennan and Black, sees any step away from Article Il's safeguards of
judicial independence as a long slide down a slippery slope. In contrast,
the functionalist camp, exemplified by Justices Harlan and O'Connor,
stresses the practicalities of adjudication and the need to defer to
Congress's Article I power.
The functional arguments are more persuasive, in part because
protective theorists, despite their salutary concern for judicial
independence, fail to recognize the structural arguments for non-Article
III tribunals. For example, English history well-known to the Framers
demonstrates that courts-martial kept the military in check, thus
preserving civilian control. Both courts-martial and military commissions
* Copyright © 2015 Peter Margulies. Professor of Law, Roger Williams University
School of Law; B.A., Colgate; J.D., Columbia Law School, 1981. 1served as co-counsel
on an amicus curiae brief to the en banc D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals urging the
court to uphold the military commission conviction of Ali Hamza al Bahlul. See Brief
of Amici Curiae Former Government Officials et al. in Support of Respondent, Al
Bahlul v. United States, No. 11-1324, 2014 WL 3437485 (D.C. Cir. July 14, 2014) (en
banc). I acted as co-counsel for a similar group of amici who submitted a brief on
remand from the full D.C. Circuit to a panel of that court. See Brief on Remand of
Former Government Officials et al., available at http://www.lawfareblog.comlwpcontent/uploads/2014/09/Bahlul-Govt-Amicus.pdf. I thank Eugene Fidell and Chris
Jenks for comments on a previous draft.
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can serve a similar structuralfunction today, if their creation is governed
by a limiting principle. A limiting principle for military commissions
would require that any charge be reasonably related to violations of
international law. Court-martialjurisdiction should be limited to servicemembers and contractors who purposefully affiliate with the armed forces.
These limiting principles will enable Congress to exercise its Article I war
powers while preserving the core value ofjudicial independence.
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INTRODUCTION

Striking a blow for judicial candor, Chief Justice Roberts
acknowledged in Stern v. Marshall that the Court's analysis of when
Congress can establish non-Article III tribunals "has not been entirely
consistent" and has inspired "some debate." ' Recent developments
regarding military tribunals have confirmed these insights. Debates
about the compatibility of both courts-martial and military
commissions with Article 1112 pit a protective camp against a
functional approach. The protective camp, driven by classic opinions
by Justices Brennan 3 and Black, 4 sees any step away from Article III's
safeguards of judicial independence, such as lifetime tenure, as a long
slide down a slippery slope. In contrast, the functionalist camp,
exemplified by Justices Harlan 5 and O'Connor, 6 stresses the
I Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011). Thirty years earlier, Justice
Rehnquist had used more vivid language, acknowledging that some knowledgeable
observers, including colleagues on the Court, might perceive the relevant precedents
as "landmarks on a judicial 'darkling plain' where ignorant armies have clashed by
night." Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (paraphrasing Justice White's dissent); see also
Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2621 (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing "suspicion that something
is seriously amiss with our jurisprudence in this area"); Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at
90 (citing "frequently arcane distinctions and confusing precedents").
2 U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 1.
3 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 74 (warning that congressional expansion of
bankruptcy jurisdiction risked "encroachment upon powers reserved to the Judicial
Branch").
4 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 22 (1955) (warning of
"dangers lurking in military trials which were sought to be avoided by the Bill of
Rights and Article 1II").
5 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962) (noting historical flexibility
in construing scope of Article Ill regarding tribunals such as territorial courts "outside
the normal context of the federal system").
6 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)
(cautioning that an unduly strict reading of Article Ill could "unduly constrict Congress'
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practicalities of adjudication and the need to defer to Congress's
Article I power. This Article argues for the functional approach on two
current issues regarding the propriety of military tribunals under
Article Ill.
Military tribunals do not provide a grand or petit jury. Nor do they
include judges with the lifetime tenure of Article III judges.7
Therefore, suspected terrorists tried in military commissions have
argued that Article III bars trials on charges of material support and
inchoate conspiracy.8 Such charges, critics insist, belong in an Article
III forum that features an independent judge and more elaborate
procedural safeguards. In a recent case, a panel of the D.C. Circuit
took this view. The Court vacated the inchoate conspiracy of Ali
Hamza al Bahlul, 9 a former propaganda aide to Osama bin Laden. 10 In
ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers").
7 Toth, 350 U.S. at 17.
8 Inchoate conspiracy entails mere agreement to commit a criminal act, but does
not require a completed act. See Al Bahlul v. United States (Al Bahlul 1), 767 F.3d 1, 31
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (remanding to panel on the Article III issue); Al Bahlul v.
United States (Al Bahlul II), 792 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (holding that Article III
precludes a military commission trial on charges of inchoate conspiracy and that al
Bahlul did not forfeit his Article Ill challenge to his conviction by failing to raise it
below); en banc rehearing granted, 2015 U.S. App. Lexis 16967 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 25,
2015) (granting rehearing on both Article III and forfeiture issues).
9 Al Bahlul II, 792 F. 3d at 22. In Al Bahlul II, Judge Rogers wrote for the panel
and Judge Tatel issued a concurrence. Id. at 7. Judge Henderson dissented, adopting a
functional approach like the one advanced in this Article. Id. at 27-28 (Henderson, J.,
dissenting). In her dissent, Judge Henderson cited an earlier article of mine outlining a
functional approach to military commissions and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Id. at 44,
47 (citing Peter Margulies, Defining, Punishing, and Membership in the Community of
Nations: Material Support and Conspiracy Charges in Military Commissions, 36
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 27 (2013)).
10Al Bahlul 1,767 F.3d at 5-6; see Stephen 1. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article
III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 965-66 (2015) (arguing that military commissions violate
Article IIIif they do not fit into narrowly circumscribed categories, including trial of
recognized international law violations); cf. David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The
Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46 VA. J. INT'L U. 5, 74-75 (2005)
(asserting that international law would bar military commission trial of conspiracy
charges). For commentary on this issue, compare Peter Margulies, Detained Suspected
Terrorists: Trial in Military Courts or Civilian Courts?, 2 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
(FEDERALIST EDITION) 157, 167-68 (2015), available at http://www.harvardjlpp.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Marguiles Final.pdf (arguing that case law on
Article IIIsupports military commissions that try belligerents in armed conflicts for
conduct reasonably related to violations of international law), with Jonathan Hafetz,
Policing the Line: InternationalLaw, Article III, and the Constitutional Limits of Military
Jurisdiction, 2014 Wis. L. REV. 681, 693-713 (acknowledging that precedents on
Article Ill can be read to permit military commissions, but arguing that this authority
should be read narrowly to allow only military commission prosecutions based on
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the military justice area, involving proceedings to discipline U.S.
service-members, critics insist that an Article III court is the only
suitable forum for charges against civilian contractors who work
alongside U.S. troops abroad. Courts-martial, these critics insist, lack
the independence and procedural safeguards necessary to protect the
rights of civilians. 1 In both settings, critics of the functionalist
approach fail to show adequate deference to Congress's exercise of its
Article I powers.
Examining these questions requires consulting the challenging case
law on non-Article III tribunals, which then Justice Rehnquist had
characterized as defying "easy synthesis."' 12 The conventional view,
acknowledged in somewhat sardonic tones by Justice Rehnquist as "a
general proposition and three tidy exceptions,"1 3 is that matters
involving criminal responsibility or claims for damages should
generally be entertained in either state courts or Article III tribunals,
with three exceptions: territorial courts, 14 courts-martial,15 and the
most elusive category of all, "public rights."' 6 However, these three
categories are anything but tidy, 17 and may not even be exceptions.

universally recognized violations of international law).
"1 United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256, 281 (C.A.A.F. 2012); cf. Vladeck, supra note
10 (questioning such jurisdiction).
12 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). For leading scholarly efforts to attempt the task,
see generally Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233 (1990) (proposing flexible
approach that largely defers to Congress's Article I powers); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915
(1988) [hereinafter Legislative Courts and Article III] (arguing that appellate review by
Article III court cures most Article III infirmities); James E. Pfander, Article I
Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 643 (2004) (arguing that bankruptcy courts and similar tribunals that are
adjuncts of Article Ill courts do not present intractable Article IIl issues).
13 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91.
14 Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828).
15 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 82-83 (1857).
16 Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2621 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting
"firmly established historical practice" regarding these categories, while narrowing the
third category to "true 'public rights' cases"). In Stern, Chief Justice Roberts conceded
that the Court's public rights jurisprudence lacked clarity. Id. at 2615 ("recent
cases ... failI] to provide concrete guidance."). The foundational case on public rights
is Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 283-85
(1856) (holding that federal government could use summary administrative procedure
to recover outstanding tax revenues from federal customs collector).
17 See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 951-54.
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Take the case of federal bankruptcy jurisdiction. As Justice White
noted in a landmark case' 8 and Chief Justice Roberts tacitly
acknowledged in Stern, the vast majority of claims worked out in the
course of a bankruptcy proceeding are state law claims between private
parties. 19 By their terms, therefore, such claims do not fit within the
"public rights" exception to Article IIl, which in its origins entailed
disputes between the government as a whole and the government's
own officials. 20 Those seeking an answer about why most bankruptcy
jurisdiction survives need to look beyond these supposedly "tidy"
21
exceptions.
Moreover, as the Court demonstrated in affirming the convictions of
Nazi saboteurs in military commissions, 22 the military justice category
is also untidy - it can include not only courts-martial, but also
military commissions that dispense justice to enemy belligerents in an
armed conflict with the United States.
As for territorial courts, commentators both recent and past have
questioned what special attributes justify the use of non-Article III

18 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 96 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that "in the
ordinary bankruptcy proceeding the great bulk of creditor claims.., have accrued under
state law... [including] claims for goods sold, wages, rent, utilities, and the like").
19 Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614 (referring approvingly to "creditors' hierarchically
ordered claims to a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res") (citing Granfinancieria, S.A.
v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989)).
20 See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 279-85.
21 In Stern, Chief Justice Roberts suggested that the Court had expanded public
rights cases to those involving specialized federal agencies. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at
2613 (limiting public rights cases to those "in which the claim at issue derives from a
federal regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert
government agency is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective within the
agency's authority"); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
852 (1986) (upholding the agency's adjudication of both the customer's complaint
against the broker and the broker's counterclaim); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985) (upholding binding arbitration in disputes
between (a) companies that had filed data to support an initial pesticide registration
and (b) other firms that had used this data to support later registration efforts for
related products); cf. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2614-15 (suggesting that consent may supply
the rationale for a bankruptcy court's resolution of creditors' claims based on state
law, while indicating that the party contesting bankruptcy court jurisdiction over the
counterclaim in Stern had not consented). The immediate problem presented by
Stern's challenge to bankruptcy court jurisdiction was alleviated by Exec. Benefits Ins.
Agency v. Arkison, 134 S. Ct. 2165, 2175 (2014) (holding that Article Ill was not
violated when the bankruptcy judge submitted proposed findings of fact to a federal
district court for de novo review).
22 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 43-44 (1942).
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tribunals there, especially since some territories such as Puerto Rico
23
have readily accommodated Article III tribunals.
Adding to the puzzlement, the Supreme Court has declined to view
tribunals such as military commissions as "exceptions" to Article III,
instead opining that commissions are not "courts" at all (at least in the
Article III sense). 24 In Quirin, the Court sought to distinguish courtsmartial, which enjoy an express exception from the Fifth Amendment
right to a grand jury, 25 from military commissions, which lack any
such express exception. Commissions, the Court opined, were an
entirely different type of tribunal that relied on the lessons of history
and Congress's Article I powers. 26 Viewed in this light, commissions
did not require the installation of Article III safeguards, even though
commissions were also outside the "tidy exceptions" Justice Rehnquist
wryly invoked.
Sorting out these puzzles is not merely a matter of academic interest.
It also entails a real human stake. Military courts and commissions
adjudicate matters of life and death. 27 They affect the reputation of the
United States, both by controlling the conduct of U.S. forces and by
holding foreign nationals accountable. At the same time, military
tribunals represent an important "incident" of Congress's power to
initiate wars. 28 A turn in the doctrine that makes military tribunals too
easy to convene, or too difficult, has stakes for the individuals
involved and for national security. These puzzles also tell us much
about constitutional method; it is to these methodological questions
that I now turn.
In this battle about military tribunals, there are two opposing
schools of thought: the protective and functional perspectives. The
protective camp regards even the most isolated incursions on the
jurisdiction of Article III courts as a slippery slope with a steep
downward trajectory for both individual liberty and the separation of
powers. 29 For the protective camp, even "[silight encroachments" on
the protections built into Article III can pave the way for fresh

See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 934 n.3, 945.
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39 (observing that military commissions "are not courts in
the sense of the judiciary Article" of the Constitution).
23
24

25 U.S. CONST.

amend. V.

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 29-30, 39.
27 Al Bahlul, for example, was sentenced to life in prison. See Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d
1, 5 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (en banc).
28 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26.
29 See Hafetz, supra note 10, at 698-99; Vladeck, supra note 10, at 965-66.
26
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onslaughts that eventually undermine the bulwark of judicial review. 30
In the area of military tribunals, the protective camp, modeled sixty
years ago by Justice Black, views jurisdiction over any civilians
(including ex-service-members charged with crimes committed during
their period of service) as a precursor of "military rule."31 Champions
of the protective camp discount the importance of Congress's Article I
power, and view Article III as trumping congressional efforts to
efficiently fulfill regulatory objectives. Just as protective theorists
define congressional Article I powers narrowly, they narrowly
33
construe bodies of law such as international law 32 or bankruptcy law,

which provide a basis for Congress's use of its Article I powers.
Protective theorists would regard Article III as prohibiting Congress
from prospectively authorizing military commissions to try suspected
terrorists on either inchoate conspiracy or material support charges.34
They would also regard Article IIl as barring court-martial jurisdiction
over civilian contractors accompanying U.S. armed forces abroad. 35
This Article argues that functionalists have a better way of cutting
through the tangled thickets of precedent. Functionalists take to heart
Justice Jackson's view in Youngstown that the Framers contemplated a
"workable government." 36 As pragmatists, champions of a functional
perspective reject a "doctrinaire reliance on formal categories." 37 In
cases involving military justice, territorial administration, and
administrative adjudication, functionalists believe that the Framers
wished to harmonize Article III's protection of judicial independence
and Article I's enumeration of the powers of Congress. 38 To restrain
the political branches, functionalists demand a limiting principle that
preserves checks and balances. Moreover, functionalists argue that
non-Article III tribunals can reinforce, not dismantle, constitutional
structures. Non-Article III tribunals can strengthen Article III courts
by shielding the latter from contexts that would challenge their
30 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354
U.S. 1, 39 (1957)).
31 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1957).
32 See Hafetz, supra note 10, at 730.
33 See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620-21 (Scalia,J., concurring).
34 See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 970-73.
35 See id. at 972-74.
36 See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring).
37 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 586-87 (1985).
38 Justice O'Connor exemplified the functional approach; my efforts here seek to
distill and refine the pragmatic approach she outlined. See Commodity Futures
Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986); Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589.
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capacity and credibility. Functionalists are therefore willing to forego
Article Ill tribunals in specialized or exigent situations when the
39
formal safeguards of Article III are "impracticable and anomalous."
Non-Article III tribunals can also serve the checking function so
important to the Framers. Functionalists cite the Framers' belief that
efficient military justice ensures civilian control over the military. 40
Based on these premises, functionalists will support expanded
jurisdiction for military tribunals as long as those expansions serve
Congress's Article I authorities, enforce structural norms, and furnish
a limiting principle that prevents a congressional take-over of the
judiciary. This flexible stance, I argue, allows courts to fulfill their
"responsibility to see the Constitution work." 41
The Article is in four Parts. Part I discusses the virtues of judicial
independence under Article III, as well as the Framers' cautionary
notes on the limits of Article III tribunals. Part II discusses the
protective and functional camps, and analyzes the Supreme Court's
perplexing case law on when non-Article III tribunals are permissible.
Part III discusses military justice, centering on the protective theorists'
misreading of the structural rationale for courts-martial. It argues that
courts-martial should have jurisdiction over civilian contractors
abroad. Part IV takes up military commissions, arguing that Article III
is satisfied by a rule limiting commissions to charges reasonably
related to international law.
I.

GIVING THE PROTECTIVE PRINCIPLE ITS DUE: THE RATIONALE FOR

ARTICLE III COURTS

Acolytes of the protective approach are correct in noting Article III's
importance to the separation of powers. Hamilton wrote in Federalist
No. 78 about the need for an independent judiciary. 42 In Hamilton's
scheme, the judiciary would be a crucial "intermediate body between

39 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (explaining why the Fourth Amendment does not require a warrant for a
search abroad of the property of a person with no previous ties to the United States). See
generally Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 38-39 (1942) (noting that the Framers appreciated
the difficulty of setting up Article Ill tribunals in the midst of armed conflict).
40 See Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S.
748, 760-63 (1996) (discussing the English experience with military justice in the
17th and 18th centuries and its influence on the Framers).
41 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962) (explaining ChiefJustice John

Marshall's rationale for permitting non-Article III territorial courts).
42 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
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the people and the legislature." 43 In this capacity, the courts would
"keep [the legislature] within the limits assigned to [its] authority"
44
under the Constitution.
For Hamilton, this need to police legislative limits derived from a
psychology of political majorities that underlay the Framers' concern
for separation of powers. Hamilton, following Enlightenment
psychology, believed that the political branches were prone to shortterm thinking, largely because their dependence on the people would
make them subject to the deficits that afflict political majorities. 45 As
Hamilton put it, "ill humors" such as fear, bias, envy, or avarice can
produce "serious oppressions" of minorities. 46 Such "momentary
inclination[s]" could place the Constitution at risk, if judicial review
was not available to ensure that the political branches act on "better
information" and "more deliberate reflection." 47 While the passions of
the moment could sway the political branches, the judiciary would be
independent from these branches. The judiciary would therefore have
the distance and disinterest to supply the "deliberation" that the
political branches sometimes sadly lacked.48 By conferring lifetime

43

Id.

44

Id.

45 Hamilton refined these concepts in the course of the practice of law prior to the

constitutional convention, as he argued successfully in the celebrated New York case
of Rutgers v. Waddington for judicial review of a New York statute that violated
international law. See 1 THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON: DOCUMENTS AND
COMMENTARY 393, 400 n.* (Julius Goebel, Jr. et al. eds., 1964) (criticizing the impulse
toward "revenge" against Britain that had driven enactment of the challenged law); cf.
Daniel M. Golove & Daniel J. Hulsebosch, A Civilized Nation: The Early American
Constitution, the Law of Nations, and the Pursuit of International Recognition, 85 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 932, 962-66 (2010) (discussing Rutgers' importance); Peter Margulies,
Defining, Punishing, and Membership in the Community of Nations: Material Support and
Conspiracy Charges in Military Commissions, 36 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 11-21 (2013)
[hereinafter Defining and Punishing] (discussing political psychology outlined by
international law publicists such as Pufendorf and Vattel and development of these
ideas by Hamilton).
46 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 42, at 469.
47 Id.
48 See Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1524-30 (1988)
(explaining how a "process-based, republican-not-pluralist constitutional jurisprudence"
could avoid the problem of subordination to popular politics); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond
the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1564-71 (1988) (explaining how republican
approaches call for deliberation in the political process); cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr.,
Commentary: What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth Reviving?, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1695,
1703-20 (1989) (arguing that republicanism's critique of liberalism's stance on
deliberation is incomplete and exaggerated but provides a useful challenge to liberal
premises such as neutrality).
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tenure on judges, Article III guarded against the "encroachments and
oppressions of the representative body." 49 Hamilton warned that any
lesser protection for judges, including the prospect of renewable terms
at the pleasure of the political branches, would "be fatal to [the
courts'] necessary independence."5 0 A judiciary that held office subject
to political considerations would be "unwilling[] to hazard the
displeasure" of the political branches, 51 and would decide cases based
on the perceived "popularity" 52 of the outcome to be selected, rather
than its soundness on the merits.
Chief Justice Marshall's groundbreaking opinion in Marbury v.
Madison53 implicitly invoked this same premise. Marbury shares with
Federalist No. 78 the view that, in founding moments, people
formulate fundamental principles to guide their future. 54 Principles
selected through the "great exertion" of founding moments, 55 like the
Framers' convening in the long, hot summer in Philadelphia in 1787,
should be engineered to withstand passing impulses.56 Chief Justice
Marshall implied that the judiciary is the only branch capable of
vindicating the Framers' vision of abiding limits, since it is insulated
from the passing political winds.
In addition to the structural argument about the need for judicial
independence made by both Hamilton and (more indirectly) by
Marshall, Hamilton added a pragmatic argument about the quality of
personnel that lifetime tenure would yield. Hamilton recognized that
few individuals would possess the thirst for "long and laborious study"
of precedents required of the judge and the "integrity" that was also
necessary for such special service. 57 Lifetime tenure would attract
individuals who had displayed such virtues in their legal practice,
while a more uncertain term of office would "naturally discourage
58
such characters."

49 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 42, at 465.
50 Id. at 471.

51 Id.
52

Id.

53

5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).

54 See id. at 176.

55 Id.
56 See id. at 174 (doubting that the Framers intended rule solely by "the discretion
of the legislature"); cf. id. at 176-77 (expressing skepticism that Framers could have
intended, in crafting a written constitution designed to be permanent, that Congress
would be free "at any time" to exceed the limits the Constitution set).
57 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 42, at 471.
58

Id.
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Hamilton also wrote of the importance of ensuring that the benefits
of federal judicial power were available in disputes between a U.S.
citizen or state and "foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects."5 9 As
Hamilton put it, the "denial or perversion of justice" in a judicial
decisions in one nation affecting a foreign state's citizens is a prime
cause for war. 60 Bringing the capacity for deliberation of the federal
judiciary to bear on controversies dealing with foreign nationals was a
sure way to minimize such causes of hostilities. Hence, Hamilton
concluded, the federal courts should "have cognizance of all causes in
which the citizens of other countries are concerned." 61 One can
interpret both the Constitution's language of "Controversies" and
Hamilton's of "causes" as referring only to civil suits or proceedings,
not to criminal prosecutions. Indeed, Article III has never been read to
require that federal courts preside over the criminal trials of foreign
nationals who have allegedly violated state criminal laws, as long as
foreign nationals like all other criminal defendants can have recourse
to the federal courts to address state violations of the federal
constitution. However, Hamilton's discussion of the nature of national
interests here suggests that any forum besides the federal judiciary
should be on a sound legal footing.
At the same time, those carving out a role for Article III tribunals
should be mindful of Hamilton's reminder that the judiciary is the
"least dangerous" branch. 62 The judiciary, Hamilton observed,
compared with the political branches, "has no influence over either
the sword or the purse." 63 Arrayed against the "force" and political
"will" of the political branches, it has only "judgment" to commend
it. 6 4 Indeed, as Hamilton conceded, to render those "judgments"
effective in the world, the judiciary requires the "aid of the executive
arm," through the executive branch's collaboration in the mutual
project of self-government and the more tangible assistance provided
by federal marshals. 65 Nurturing that mutual project requires the
cultivation of second-order judgment about the circumstances in
which the court can best play its role. That second-order judgment,

59 U.S. CONST. art. III,
60 THE FEDERALIST No.

§ 2, cl.1.
80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

61 Id.
62 THE FEDERALIST No.
63
64
65

Id.
Id.
Id.

78, supra note 42, at 465.
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Hamilton implied, may in turn call for some reticence in pronouncing
66
judgments about matters of "the sword [and] the purse."
With this background in mind on the institutional and structural
importance of Article III protections, we turn to the evolution of the
Court's jurisprudence.
II.

A RIDDLE

WRAPPED INSIDE AN ENIGMA: THE COURT'S ARTICLE III

JURISPRUDENCE

The Supreme Court's Article III case law has inspired widespread
puzzlement, including chagrin among the Justices themselves. This
section first looks at the two principal camps interpreting this case
law. Then it turns to the case law itself.
A.

Protective and FunctionalApproaches

The two dominant strands in the case law on non-Article III
tribunals are the functional and protective perspectives. The
functional view, which this Article favors, seeks to reconcile Article III
protections with Congress's Article I prerogatives, the President's
status under Article I as Commander in Chief, and the practical
challenges posed by specialized or exigent situations. The protective
view views Article III as trumping both Articles I and II, and regards
mention of practicalities the way the occupant of a tent views the
proverbial camel's nose: as a signal that an inner sanctum is about to
be invaded.
During the last sixty years, Justices Brennan and Black served as the
most eloquent proponents of the protective approach. 6 7 They focused
on the benefits of an independent judiciary for both constitutional
structure and rights. On rights, Justice Brennan cited Hamilton for the
proposition that an independent judiciary would be in a position to
"guarantee that the process of adjudication itself remained
impartial." 68 On this view, any detour from Article III's strictures
66 Alexander M. Bickel, The New Supreme Court: Prospects and Problems, 45 TUL. L.
REV. 229, 229 (1971).
67 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-

60, 76 (1982) (plurality opinion by Brennan, J.) (noting Hamilton's views in Federalist
No. 78 in holding that Article IllI barred bankruptcy court jurisdiction over tort and
contract action brought by bankruptcy petitioner against another entity that was not
claimant in the bankruptcy proceeding); United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S.
11, 18-23 (1955) (Black, J., for majority) (holding that court-martial lacked
jurisdiction over individual discharged from the service, even regarding acts
committed while in the armed forces).
68 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58.
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(such as lifetime tenure), would imperil the fair hearing of individual
claims. Moreover, non-Article III tribunals lack attributes of the more
formal forum, including provisions for a jury trial 69 and, in criminal
cases, presentment to a grand jury.
Alarmed by this prospect, protective theorists turn to that favorite
metaphor for legal anxiety: the slippery slope. 70 For acolytes of the
protective approach, a momentary diversion from the mainstream path
of Article III tribunals is never an idle frolic. Instead, as Justice Black
warned, "Slight encroachments create new boundaries from which
legions of power can seek new territory to capture." 71 Protective
theorists, ever wary of incursions on Article III's guarantees, view even
a modest expansion of non-Article III tribunals as an existential threat.
For example, Justice Black, authoring a plurality opinion in a decision
holding that military courts could not try dependents of servicemembers for crimes committed on U.S. bases, warned that the result of
a different decision would be the rise of "military rule." 72 "Policing the

line," as Professor Hafetz characterizes this stance, is not merely a
choice among competing models; it is a solemn duty at the core of
constitutional governance. 73
Protective theorists also perceive Article III courts as able to
vindicate the Framers' scheme of checks and balances. Non-Article III
tribunals, in contrast, threaten to undermine that scheme, granting
either Congress or the President untrammeled power. Because of this
fear, protective theorists tend to systematically discount Congress's
interest in exercising its Article I authority, including the authority to
address military discipline, 74 abusive trade practices, 75 and territorial
governance. 76 Protective theorists also unduly discount the practical
69 See U.S. CONST. art. 1ll, § 2, cl. 3.
70 Cf. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 852 (1986)

(in upholding non-Article III tribunal's adjudication of counterclaim by broker against
customer, Justice O'Connor noted that "we decline to endorse an absolute prohibition
on such jurisdiction out of fear of where some hypothetical 'slippery slope' may
deposit us").
71 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39 (1957), cited in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594,
2620 (2011).
72 Reid, 354 U.S. at 26-27.
73 See Hafetz, supra note 10, at 682-85 (describing the role of international law in
defining the constitutional limits of military commissions); cf. Janet Cooper
Alexander, The Law-Free Zone and Back Again, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 551, 612-16
(expressing concern about the sources of commission jurisdiction to try crimes such
as conspiracy and material support).
74 See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 962-64.
75 See Schor, 478 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 599 (1962) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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difficulties entailed in requiring the formal appurtenances of Article III
courts for all of these specialized contexts. Moreover, protective
theorists ignore the role of non-Article III tribunals since the Framers'
day in promoting checks and balances. The English experience, for
example, suggested that military courts imposed swift and sure
77
discipline that was necessary to the preservation of civilian control.
The case law and commentary espousing the protective approach does
78
not acknowledge this key development, well-known to the Framers.
Protective theorists do not wish to do away with all non-Article III
tribunals. However, they want to narrowly construe both the scope
and rationale of these tribunals. For example, protective theorists want
to strictly limit military commissions to trying suspected terrorists on
79
charges that international law has expressly recognized.
Functionalists take a different tack, centering on Justice Jackson's
view that the Framers contemplated a "workable government."
Consistent with this premise, functionalists8O read Article III in light of
81
the importance of Congress exercising its Article I powers.
Functionalists are willing to accept innovations that promote
Congress's goals, as long as those innovations have a limiting principle
that preserves checks and balances. Moreover, functionalists are more
willing to view non-Article III tribunals as reinforcing the structural
values served by Article III courts and other constitutional checks and
balances. Taking a pragmatic perspective, functionalists are more
attuned to contexts when Article III courts are "impracticable and
anomalous."8 2 In these situations, functionalists contend, the greater
informality and adaptability of non-Article III tribunals saves Article
III tribunals from ineffectiveness, embarrassment, and error,
preserving the special authority of those tribunals. Similarly,

77 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 760-62 (1996).
78 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 24-30 (1957) (offering account of English
experience that recounts only cautionary experiences with military justice); infra
notes 150-60 and accompanying text (analyzing the historical question).
79 See Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 8-11 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
80 See Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers
Questions -

A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 488, 507 (1987) (noting that

the non-Article Ill tribunal in Schor "promoted an appropriate congressional
purpose").
81 See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011) (indicating support in case
law for non-Article IIItribunals "integrally related to particular federal government
action"); Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985).
82 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990).
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functionalists argue based on English and U.S. history that military
justice aids in the subordination of military to civilian authority.83
B.

Into the Labyrinth: Conundrums and Common Ground in Article III
Case Law

While an absolutist preference for Article III tribunals may have
been a fair reading of the Constitution's text, functional concerns have
tempered that preference from the earliest precedents. 84 This
subsection argues that functionalism has figured prominently in
Article III questions since the era of Chief Justice Marshall. As a
general matter, the Supreme Court has taken a functional turn,
requiring three factors: (1) a reasonable nexus between a non-Article
III tribunal and Congress's Article I powers; (2) evidence that nonArticle III tribunals will reinforce, rather than erode, constitutional
structure; and 3) a limiting principle that will prevent Congress from
using its Article I power to eviscerate Article III adjudication and the
jurisdiction of state courts. Where the Court could not identify a
limiting principle, it has held that a non-Article III tribunal violated
the separation of powers. The following discussion examines the
interplay of these factors in the areas that have drawn the most
sustained judicial attention: territorial courts, public rights, military
tribunals, and bankruptcy.
1. Territorial Courts
Chief Justice Marshall recognized that Congress's power to make
"all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory belonging to
the United States" authorized Congress to establish non-Article III
tribunals in those territories. 85 As Chief Justice Marshall explained,
these courts were incidents of the "general right of sovereignty, which
exists in the government" to ensure law, order, and efficient
administration in territories abroad. 86 Subsequently, Justice Harlan
83 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 760-62 (1996). For an argument that the
advice of military attorneys on international law can sometimes be required to keep
civilian officials honest, see Deborah N. Pearlstein, The Soldier, the State, and the
Separation of Powers, 90 TEX. L. REV. 797, 809-11 (2012).
84 See Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828). In Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962), Justice Harlan read Canter as reflecting Chief
Justice Marshall's vision of a workable government that would allow the Framers'
scheme to endure over time.
85 Canter, 26 U.S. at 546 (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2).
86 Id.
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explained that Marshall's opinion owed much to the "practical
problems" of territorial administration.87 In territories such as Florida
that were headed to statehood, requiring that a court be an Article III
tribunal would have deprived Congress of needed flexibility.
Tellingly, requiring Article III tribunals would also have ultimately
damaged the continued standing and reputation of federal courts and
impaired self-government in the territories. Prior to statehood, a
territory needed courts for "general jurisdiction" over matters of
strictly local and territorial interest that elsewhere belongs in state
courts. 88 Appointing Article III judges to hear such matters, while it

might have been constitutionally permissible, would have been
wasteful. The need for such tribunals would have ceased at statehood,
when a former territory would be able to establish its own judiciary to
handle torts, property, contracts, and other traditional state law
issues.8 9 Moreover, Congress generally left the territories to devise
their own "municipal law," without requiring the separation of powers
that the Constitution required of the federal government. 90 Instead of
requiring the separation of powers, which would have proven
unwieldy in dealing with disparate legal cultures, Congress retained a
veto over territorial self-government measures. 91 Requiring strict
adherence to Article III in this setting would have diminished selfgovernment in the territories. Arraying Article III against selfgovernment in the territories would have imposed significant strain on
structural values.
Justice Harlan, reading Chief Justice Marshall's opinion, contended
that reading Article III to impair Congress's exercise of constitutional
power and damage structural values would have been "dogmatic" and
"doctrinaire in the extreme." 92 Justice Marshall, Justice Harlan
explained, "conscious... of his responsibility to see the Constitution
work," read the Constitution as providing the "flexibility" necessary to
deal with these special challenges. 93 This reading also contained a
limiting principle. Congress's power to administer territories supplied
the rationale for the non-Article III tribunals in Canter. Therefore, the
non-Article III tribunals upheld there would not be permissible within
the states, where Congress had no need (and no power) to establish
87 Zdanok, 370 U.S. at 545.
88 Id. at 545-46.
89 See id. at 545-46.
90 Id. at 546.
91 Id.
92

Id.

93 Id. at 547 (emphasis added).
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courts of general jurisdiction, and congressionally created courts were
not needed for self-government.
In Palmore v. United States,94 the Court again cited Canter in
upholding Congress's creation of non-Article III District of Columbia
courts with jurisdiction over "strictly local" civil and criminal
matters. 95 Justice White, writing for the majority, cited Congress's
power under Article I to "exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases
whatsoever, over" the District of Columbia. 96 Pursuant to this
provision, Congress, according to Justice White, can exercise
"plenary" power over governmental power in the District of
Columbia. 97 The Framers gave Congress that power to fulfill the
Framers' goal of carving out a discrete geographic area outside the
sovereign authority of any of the several states to serve as the seat of
the national government. Establishing non-Article III courts for the
District of Columbia fit snugly within this grant of constitutional
power to Congress. To buttress his analysis, Justice White analogized
congressional power to create courts in the District of Columbia to the
power to make rules regarding U.S. territories. 98 As in Canter,
requiring lifetime tenure for judges who in essence served the same
function as state court judges elsewhere in the nation would have
made administration of laws in the District less "workable and
efficient." 99 Second-guessing Congress's exercise of its power would
have unduly discounted the "practical considerations" that Justice
Harlan in Zdanok viewed as central. 100
Justice White appeared to concede that Palmore might have been
decided differently if the government had not offered a coherent
limiting principle for Congress's power. According to Justice White,
Congress's power to create non-Article III courts in the District of
Columbia extended only to courts adjudicating "strictly local" issues
pertaining to governance within the District.1 01 The result might have
been quite different, Justice White hinted, had Congress sought to
create non-Article III courts to adjudicate matters of "constitutional
and ... general concern."' 102 Deferring to Congress in that event would
94 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
95 Id. at 407.
96 Id. at 397 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl.17).
97 Id.

98 Id. at 402-03.
99 Id. at 409.
100 Id. at 404.
101 Id. at 407.
102 See id.
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have raised the specter of wholesale congressional displacement of
Article III tribunals.
Tellingly, Congress's channeling of local matters to non-Article III
courts also had structural benefits for Article III tribunals. According
to Justice White, Congress established the courts at issue in Palmore to
free Article III courts from the "smothering responsibility" of
proliferating civil and criminal local litigation.10 3 Relieved of this
burden, Article III courts would have more time available for the
weighty federal questions where their expertise is most needed.
2.

Public Rights Cases

Congress's Article I powers, the reinforcement of other structural
virtues, and a robust limiting principle also informed the Court's first
"public rights" case, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co. 104 In Murray's Lessee, the Court upheld a summary warrant issued

by Treasury Department officials for recovery of a balance owed to the
government by a customs collector. According to the Court, English
practice, well-known to the Framers of the U.S. Constitution, had
been to employ a summary procedure. 105 The Court found a similar
trend in U.S. practice since the first quarter-century of the new
republic's existence. 106 Crafting a summary procedure to ensure the
due diligence of customs collectors was a crucial adjunct of the power
to tax, which the Constitution granted to Congress in Article 1.107 The
summary remedy endorsed by the Court made tax collectors more
accountable and ensured that revenues collected from taxpayers would
serve appropriate public purposes. As the Court observed in finding
that such summary administrative procedures did not violate Article
III, there was an "[ilmperative necessity"o 8 in ensuring that collectors
of tax revenue would promptly convey that revenue to the
government, which would otherwise risk defaulting on its own
obligations. 109
Id.

at 408-09.
Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
105 Id. at 277 (consulting "settled usages and modes of proceeding" in England, and
concluding that "there has been no period, since the establishment of the English
monarchy, when there has not been.., a summary method for the recovery of debts
due to the crown, and especially those due from receivers of the revenues").
106 Id. at 279 (noting that Treasury officials had enjoyed this authority in some
103
104

form since 1813).
107 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
108 Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 282.
109 See id. at 281 (noting that the purpose of the tax collector's receipt of tax

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 49:305

The summary procedure endorsed in Murray's Lessee also served the
values underlying Article IlI. Enlisting the courts as the first line of
defense against tax collectors going rogue would have set up the
courts to fail, since the delay occasioned by a full-dress "judicial
controversy"'1 0 made the courts an institution ill-suited to the timesensitive task at hand. Sparing the courts this burden conserved their
legitimacy for cases better suited to their skill set. Moreover, a limiting
principle regulated the summary administrative procedures that the
Court upheld. Private individuals seeking to collect on debts would
not have recourse to the summary procedure; they would need to seek
a judicial resolution of their disputes.
Cases like Canter and Murray's Lessee reinforced the constitutional
structure, even as they departed from the formalities of Article Ill
tribunals. Imposing formalities that do not fit the situation does not
merely frustrate Congress's efforts to exercise its Article I powers; it
also degrades the virtues embodied in Article III. As Justice Kennedy
observed in Verdugo-Urquidez, explaining why the Fourth Amendment
did not require a warrant for a search abroad of the premises of a
person with no ties to the U.S., we should not require the exercise of
judicial power when use of that power would be "impracticable and
'
anomalous."111
Federal judicial power would not be a practical
measure for searches abroad, Justice Kennedy explained, where it is
not clear that foreign officials would obey the terms of a warrant, and
shifting exigencies might make those terms irrelevant prior to
execution of the search. In far-flung U.S. territories, Article III courts
might become a white elephant, displaying minimal utility but
requiring extensive maintenance. Similarly, requiring the government
to jump through Article III's hoops to recover tax revenue from an
obdurate tax collector could result in a Dickensian spectacle of
protracted justice that would bring courts in general into disrepute.
Avoiding these kinds of self-inflicted wounds is crucial to the
Bickelian notion of "passive virtues" 112 and to Justice Frankfurter's

revenue is to "use it in payment of the debts of the government" and that this purpose
contemplated the power to use "appropriate means to secure" the availability of
revenue collected).
110 Id. at 282.
111 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
112 See generally Alexander M. Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term Foreword:
The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961) (arguing that courts in exercise of
prudence should often decline to hear cases that might insert courts into political and
social disputes that courts are ill-equipped to address).
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vision of judicial restraint. 113 It also plays a role in the crafting of
standing doctrine to restrict courts to "cases and controversies"" 4 and5
in the canon disfavoring extraterritorial application of statutes.1
Citing practicality as a justification for non-Article III tribunals should
not permit the jettisoning of Article III's protections; however, it acts
as a counterweight to the protective camp's contention that Article
III's safeguards are an unalloyed good and that universal application of
those safeguards necessarily serves Article III's underlying values.
3.

Military Tribunals

Bearing out the salience of this structure-reinforcing strand, the
teachings of practicality soon added another category to join the
territorial courts and public rights cases: military justice. Here, the
important factors were the exigency of the situations in which military
justice was necessary and the practical difficulty of more formal
alternatives. The Articles of War commissioned by the Continental
Congress and drafted by John Adams cited the "dangerous and critical
situation" created by the British effort to suppress "by force of arms"
the colonists' opposition to taxation without representation.' 6 To field
an armed force capable of resisting the British, the colonists felt it
necessary to ensure military discipline by adapting the British system
of courts-martial." 7 More formal mechanisms including staples of
113 See Brad Snyder, Frankfurterand Popular Constitutionalism, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV.
343, 367-69 (2013) (discussing Frankfurter's view that to serve their proper purpose,
courts needed humility and a sense of the limits of judicial competence).
"14 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210-12 (1962); cf. Rachel E. Barkow, More
Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial
Supremacy, 102 COLuM. L. REV. 237, 267 n.158 (2002) (discussing the doctrine in
foreign affairs and arguing for greater reliance); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New Formalism
in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1417-18, 1422-23
(1999) (arguing that frank deference on the merits is superior to applying the political
question doctrine); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE U.
597, 605-06 (1976) (arguing that the political question doctrine, which some have
argued is required by Article IIl, is best understood as a variant of deference on the
merits applied to the political branches). My goal here is not to suggest that questions
resolved by non-Article Ill tribunals are political questions or that the issue of the
constitutionality of such tribunals fits under that rubric. I aim only to note courts'
awareness that expansive use of judicial power can undermine courts as institutions.
115 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro. Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013).
116 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS: 1774-1789, at 111 (1905).
117 See id. at 112 (providing that a "general court-martial" would be convened to try
and punish insubordination). Over 150 years after enactment of the Articles of War, the
Supreme Court in Ex parte Quirin noted the practical impediments to civilian courts
trying participants in an armed conflict, asserting that military commissions typically
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civilian courts such as trial by jury would have made the discipline of
delinquent troops less efficient. As we shall see, the Articles of War
also served to subordinate the military to civilian control. The Articles
accomplished this by authorizing convening of a general court-martial
to try and punish any 11
member of the armed forces who participated in
"mutiny or sedition," 8 or was present during any episode of same
and failed to "use his utmost endeavours to suppress" such activity.19
Congress's power under Article I of the Constitution made the
military justice category even more compelling. As the Court noted in
Dynes v. Hoover, 20 Congress has the power under Article I to "make
rules for the government of the land and naval forces,"121 which brings

with it the power to maintain discipline in the ranks through the "trial
and punishment of military ...

offences in the manner ...

practiced

by civilized nations." 122 Military justice also served Article III values,
by ensuring that federal courts, who as Hamilton had noted in
Federalist No. 78 lacked acquaintance with "the sword," did not have
to expend their "judgment" on matters foreign to their experience and
training. Courts-martial could therefore be established with a rationale
that was "entirely independent" of and "without any connection to"
the values served by "the 3d article of the Constitution."' 123 Here, too, a
limiting principle was conveniently at hand: tribunals authorized for
the trial of members of the armed forces could not be used to try
persons with no ties to the armed forces of the United States.
4.

Current Disputes About Other Forums: Agency and Bankruptcy
Adjudication

Although some view the tripartite scheme of military justice,
territorial courts, and public rights as "tidy," 124 recent cases suggests
that structural and practical considerations may temper Article III in a
operate in exigent circumstances that are not conducive to the formalities that attend
criminal proceedings in civilian venues. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 39 (1942).
118 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, supra note 116, at 113.
119 Id.; cf. John C. Dehn, The Commander-in-Chief and the Necessities of War: A
Conceptual Framework, 83 TEMP. L. REv. 599, 614 (2011) (observing that "It] hrough
the Articles, Congress exercised detailed control over the day-to-day discipline and
operation of the armed forces").
120 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
121 Id. at 78 (citing U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 14).
122 Id. at 79.
123 Id.
124 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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broader range of cases involving Congress's Article I powers. For
example, in Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,1 25 the
Court upheld a statute that provided for an agency's adjudication of
both a customer's complaint against a commodities broker and the
broker's state law counterclaim against the customer regarding a
shortfall in the customer's account balance. The latter claim was
clearly one that arose under state law, and would therefore typically be
adjudicated either in a state forum or in a federal Article III court
exercising diversity jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, upheld the statutory scheme, citing
Congress's aim to create an "effective ... regulatory scheme."' 126 To
accomplish this goal, Justice O'Connor posited, Congress had to
establish an "inexpensive and expeditious alternative forum" for
customers asserting grievances against brokers, 127 in a setting that was
both independent of politics and aided by expertise. 128 Barring
jurisdiction over common law counterclaims like those of the dealer in
Schor would have frustrated that aim, since customers would have
been reluctant to make complaints to the agency if those complaints
1 29
triggered their exposure to counterclaims made in a different forum.
In honoring this congressional goal, Justice O'Connor rejected reliance
130
on "formalistic and unbending rules."
In addition, the decision served Article III values, by promoting
judicial economy, instead of casting the federal courts as citadels of
redundant litigation. Moreover, the Court observed, restricting the
forum to counterclaims related to customer complaints imposed a
limiting principle that forestalled any danger of a wholesale
13 1
congressional take-over of state law adjudication.
The Court recognized this danger in cases involving bankruptcy
courts. In Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
125 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
126 Id. at 855.
127

Id.

128

Id. at 856.

129

Id.

130 Id. at 851; cf. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587
(1985) (rejecting "doctrinaire reliance on formal categories" in upholding a statutory
provision that required binding arbitration to resolve certain disputes); Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 37, 53, 62 (1932) (in opinion by ChiefJustice Hughes, the Court
warned against fixating on "mere matters of form" and focused on the "substance of
what is required," and upheld agency adjudication of a claim for injuries suffered in
maritime employment, if the claim was subject to review of questions of law and
mixed questions of fact and law by an Article III court).
131 Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1986).
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Co.,1 3 2

the Court invoked Hamilton's praise of judicial independence
in striking down a provision of federal bankruptcy law. That provision
had permitted the bankruptcy court to adjudicate fraud or other state
law claims arising from conduct by a person or entity that was not a
claimant in the bankruptcy proceeding. While the regulation of
bankruptcy is of course a congressional power, 133 the Court was
134
unmoved by this, decrying the absence of a "limiting principle."'
According to the Court, if the scheme at issue passed muster,
Congress could undermine much of state law adjudication in civil
cases by expanding bankruptcy jurisdiction. Congress would also then
be able to take over state courts' jurisdiction over criminal cases by
citing the federal interest in interstate commerce. 135
5.

The Continued Importance of Limiting Principles

The presence of a limiting principle, as well as the long pedigree of
Congress's power over territorial courts and federal enclaves, played a
key role in the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v.
Hollingsworth.136 In Hollingsworth, the court upheld Congress's grant
of power to federal magistrates, who do not possess Article III
protections, to try defendants for petty crimes in federal enclaves such
as military bases. 137 Judge Edith Brown Clement's opinion for the
court cited Congress's power under Clause 17 of Article I, Section 8,
which supplied the basis for the Supreme Court's decision in

132 Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
133

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.

134 Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 73.
135 Id. at 73-74; see also Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011) (striking
down a statute allowing the bankruptcy court to hear tort counterclaims "independent
of the federal bankruptcy law"); cf. Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.Ct.
1932, 1940, 1943-4445 (2015) (holding that a petitioner in bankruptcy's implied
consent to adjudication of claims by bankruptcy court resolved any Article IIIissue
raised by such adjudication, but issuing this holding in case where asset over which
dispute arose was part of bankruptcy estate and therefore could in any case be subject
of adjudication by bankruptcy judge); id.at 1950 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (arguing
that adjudication by a bankruptcy judge did not violate Article Ill because the asset at
issue was part of the bankruptcy estate, and arguing that the majority erred by
asserting that consent would allow adjudication of claims outside the bankruptcy
estate that were protected by Article Ill).
136 United States v. Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d 556 (5th Cir. 2015).
137 See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5) (2012) (listing petty offense under which
Hollingsworth was convicted); 18 U.S.C. § 3401(b) (2012) (giving magistrates
jurisdiction over trials for petty offenses).
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Palmore.t 38 Judge Clement also cited the extensive history of
Congress's grant to magistrates of power to try non-felony offenses
committed on some federal lands. 39 Judge Clement expressly linked
her reasoning to the Supreme Court's territorial courts jurisprudence,
which has deferred to Congress's streamlining of judicial authority in
140
areas not within the jurisdiction of any state.
Over a vigorous dissent by Judge Stephen Higginson, who argued
that criminal cases required the independent adjudication that only
Article III judges could provide,'4' Judge Clement suggested that
limiting magistrates to trial of offenses committed on federal land
42
prevented a wholesale supplanting of Article III courts by Congress.
However, Judge Clement also hinted at a stricter limiting principle,
relied on by Judge Higginbotham in his concurrence: defendants, like
Hollingsworth, charged with petty offenses lack a right to a jury
trial. 143 Judge Clement thus limited the court's holding to trial of petty
offenses committed on federal enclaves. 144 Viewed in this light, trial
before a magistrate was a modest incremental deprivation, since a jury
trial would not have been available to the defendant, even if he had
been tried before an Article III judge. Limiting the holding to petty
offenses preserved Article III adjudication over felonies and certain

misdemeanors. 145
In sum, teasing out the strands in the Article III jurisprudence, we
are left with something more coherent than the "clash[] by night" that

138 Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d at 559-61.
139 Id. at 560-61.
140 Id. at 561-63 (citing Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 64 (plurality opinion)
(affirming that Congress has latitude in disclaiming Article III safeguards for tribunals
in a "geographical area[] ... in which no State operatets] as a sovereign")). But see id.
at 568-69 (Higginson, J., dissenting) (asserting that the legislative history of the
statute conferring jurisdiction on magistrates to try petty offenses committed on
federal enclaves provides no indication that trials for minor offenses have clogged
Article Ill courts).
141 Hollingsworth, 783 F.3d at 567 (Higginson, J., dissenting) (arguing, citing
Pfander, supra note 12, at 672, that Congress's power to delegate tasks to magistrates
extends only to contexts in which magistrates make recommendations subject to final
determinations by Article IlI judges).
142 Id. at 564 (plurality opinion) (noting that, after Palmore upheld congressional
power over the adjudication of ordinary crimes in the District of Columbia, nonArticle Ill tribunals regularly tried charges involving "serious felonies").
143 Id. at 560,546.
144 Id. at 559-60.
145 Reinforcing the importance of a constraining principle, Judge Patrick
Higginbotham's concurrence expressly relied on the cabined nature of the court's
holding. Id. at 564 (citing Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1996)).
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Justice Rehnquist described but something less than the "tidy"
synthesis that Justice Rehnquist disclaimed.14 6 The presence of a
substantial Article I interest clearly weighs heavily in the balance. It
also matters whether the provision at issue, viewed through the prism
of practicality, reinforces constitutional structure. Finally, the Court
has sought a limiting principle that safeguards Article III and
147
federalism values.
Ill.

MILITARYJUSTICE AND THE PROTECTIVE-FUNCTIONAL DIVIDE

As noted in the previous section, the Supreme Court has long held
that military justice is not subject to the requirements of Article 111.148
However, that mainstay of black letter law has merely ushered in a
host of questions about the defendants and offenses that are amenable
to trial in military tribunals. The Court has addressed whether civilian
dependents can be tried in military tribunals, whether former servicemembers can be tried for offenses committed while in the military,
and whether military courts can try current service-members for any
offense, or merely for those that are "service-connected." In addition,
debate continues on whether civilians who serve with the military for example, as contractors - are ever triable in military courts. As we
shall see, functionalism is more persuasive than the protective camp in
providing answers to these questions. This is in large part because
functionalism treats differences between military and civilian justice as
not merely related to the need for an effective fighting force, but as
necessary to serve other structural values, such as the subordination of

146 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 91
(1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
147 Id. at 90 (noting that the Framers would have been wary of allowing Congress
to unilaterally designate a non-Article IlIforum for state law claims that are the "stuff
of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts at Westminster in 1789"),
cited in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2609 (2011). In Stern, the Court also
rejected the argument made by several scholars, see Fallon, Legislative Courts and
Article III, supra note 12, at 922, that appellate review by an Article III court would
cure any constitutional defects with non-Article IIItribunals. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at
2611 (noting that appellate review was insufficient because "usual limited appellate
standards ... [would] require[] marked deference to ... the bankruptcy judges'
findings of fact"). But see Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S.Ct. 1932, 1945
n.10 (2015) (citing Fallon for the proposition that consent by parties curbs the risk
that an adjudicator is undermining Article III values by engaging in arbitrary decisionmaking or other conduct that compromises "[j]udicial integrity").
148 Cf. Hafetz, supra note 10, at 687-88 (discussing judicial deference to military
courts-martial jurisdiction).
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the armed forces to civilian authority. 149 Functionalists also discern
limiting principles in military justice that, compared with the
protective impulse, better reconcile Article I and Article III.
A.

English History and the Separate Sphere of MilitaryJustice

The English embraced a separate sphere of military justice warily
but willingly because political circumstances in the late 17th century
made that sphere a prerequisite for the survival of constitutionalism
itself. As freedom-loving English citizens revolted against the tyranny
of James II with the "Glorious Revolution" that invited in the benign
rulers, William of Orange and his wife Mary, some Scottish army units
loyal to the deposed Stuart king mutinied. This mutiny coincided with
the rise of external threats, including the threat from France. At this
moment of "extreme danger,"' 5 0 the English elected to make "an
That change, as Macaulay
important change in [the] polity."''
explained, involved "a legal distinction between the soldier and the
citizen."' 5 2 The distinction emerged from the understanding that a
standing army was necessary to cope with danger in an uncertain
world. 153 With the standing army came the danger of military
encroachment on civil and political rights. A separate sphere of
military justice was necessary to forestall this risk. Since there must be
"regular soldiers," Macaulay explained,
[I1t must be indispensable, both to their efficiency, and the
security of every other class, that they should be kept under a
strict discipline .... For the sake of public freedom, they

must, in the midst of freedom, be placed under a despotic rule.
They must be subject to a sharper penal code, and to a more
stringent code of procedure, than are administered by the
ordinary tribunals. 154

149 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 762-63 (1996).
150 See 3 THOMAS MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 35 (2012).
151

Id.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 37 (observing that, in an era of external threats, "the country could
not.., be secure without professional soldiers").
154 Id. at 36, cited in Loving, 517 U.S. at 763 (citing earlier edition); cf. id. at 37
(warning that "professional soldiers must be worse than useless unless they were placed
under a rule more arbitrary and severe than that to which other men were subject").
Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court in Loving, cited Macaulay in the course of
upholding Presidential authority to prescribe the death penalty for certain military
offenses, even absent congressional authorization. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 764-70.
152
153

332

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 49:305

Parliament accordingly passed a Mutiny Act, which provided that
members of the armed forces that, "[m]utiny . . . stir up sedition,
or . . . desert Her Majesty's Service" were subject to a "more exemplary
and speedy punishment than the usual forms of law will allow."155 The

English came to this perception reluctantly. In simpler times, a
standing army was "regarded by every party... with strong and not
unreasonable aversion." 156 However, changing times required
changing measures: the consensus view in England during this period
was that "what at one stage in the progress of society is pernicious
'
may at another stage by indispensable."157
As the Mutiny Act was
regularly renewed by Parliament, "[bly slow degrees familiarity
reconciled the public mind to the names, once so odious, of standing
army and court martial."1

58

This sea change occurred not as a

displacement of regular governance by emergency measures, but as a
structural paradigm shift that preserved both the state and civilians'
liberties. It was this structural choice that influenced the Framers.
Blackstone, whose writings the Framers read eagerly, 159 echoed this
structural understanding. The great English scholar noted the
importance of "keeping up a regular discipline" in the armed forces.1 60
Blackstone did not challenge the ability of the military, even in times
of peace, to impose discipline on members of the armed forces. He
added only the modest caveat that, in times of peace, "a little
relaxation of military rigour would not, one would hope, be
productive of much inconvenience."' 161 While Blackstone cited the
earlier jurist Matthew Hale in criticizing the "arbitrary" nature of
martial law, 162 the best reading of Blackstone is that this barb referred
to the routine assertion of military jurisdiction over British civilians
with no military affiliations. In this sense, Blackstone presaged the
concern voiced by the U.S. Supreme Court more than a century later
155 MACAULAY, supra note 150, at 37.
156 Id. at 35.
157

Id. at 38.

158

Id.

See Loving, 517 U.S. at 765-66 (discussing Blackstone's influence on the Framers).
160 See 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *408, available at http://avalon.law.
yale.edu/l8th-century/blackstone bklchl3.asp.
161 Id. at *402. Blackstone did strongly recommend that Parliament revise the
articles of war governing courts-martial in the army to emulate what he already
praised for the navy, namely the express mention of offenses which subject an
individual to trial and punishment. See id. at *403 (praising English naval law's
"advantage[]" that both crime and punishment were "ascertained and notorious,"
without being consigned to "arbitrary discretion").
159

162

Id. at *400.
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in Ex parte Milligan,163 in which the Court held that military
commissions lacked jurisdiction to try a U.S. citizen who had not been
a belligerent in the Civil War. In U.S. jurisprudence, this assertion of
control over the civilian population became known as "martial law,"
to serviceas distinguished from forms of military justice applicable
64
military.
the
to
connected
civilians
certain
and
members
B. The Framers'Perspective
The Framers clearly shared this view that a separate sphere for
military justice was a structurally sound approach that functioned not
only to ensure military effectiveness but also to underline and enforce
the subordination of the military to civilian control. As Justice Harlan
put it in his influential dissent in O'Callahanv. Parker,165 the structural
preoccupations of recent English history were "not lost on the
Framers ...

who doubtless feared the Executive's assertion of an

independent military authority unchecked by the people acting through
66
the Legislature." 1

The prospect of a standing army that required ongoing discipline
was not enticing for the Framers, but it was a necessity. In Federalist
No. 41, Madison conceded that a standing army would be necessary to
protect U.S. interests.1 67 Responding to opponents of the Constitution
who feared a standing army, Madison pointed out an important
structural limit to a standing army's power: the fixed two-year term for
members of the House of Representatives, who had to initiate revenue
bills, and the fixed period for budgetary appropriations. 168 These
features curbed the power and resources that a standing army could
command.
Demonstrating their comfort level with military justice, the Framers
provided an abundance of sources of congressional authority over this

163 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
164 See Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13, 21 (1879) (observing, in the course of holding
that the court-martial had jurisdiction over the clerk of a navy paymaster, that "[t]he
difference between military law and martial law is too well known to require any
remark").

165 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
166

Id. at 277 (emphasis added).

167

See THE FEDERALIST No. 41, at 257-58

James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961). Hamilton also discussed the need for structural provision for U.S. defense. See
id. No. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that "it is impossible to foresee or to
define the extent and variety of national exigencies, and the corresponding extent and
variety of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them") (italics omitted).
168

Id. at

259-60.
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domain. Congress is authorized to "provide for the common

Defence," 169 "make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval forces,"17 ° "declare War ... and make Rules concerning
Captures on Land and Water,"'171 and "define and punish... Offences
against the Law of Nations."' 72 The Congress may also make "all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper" for executing these powers.1 73 In
Ex parte Quirin, the Court read these authorities broadly, as conferring
upon Congress the authority to create military commissions for
belligerents fighting the U.S. as an incident of the "power to wage
war"; 1 74 the power to discipline U.S. service-members is no less
essential. Furthermore, the drafters of the Bill of Rights underlined the
distinctive treatment of military justice by providing that the Grand
Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not apply to any matter
"arising in the land or naval forces" of the United States. 75
This did not make the Framers credulous about the risk of military
abuses. Nor did it make their handiwork indifferent to that risk.
However, key provisions of the Constitution codified the English
understanding. Here, as well, structure and function were the
touchstones. Constitutional norms were to be safeguarded in the
military sphere largely by legislative action, not by undue judicial
intrusions.

§ 8, cl. 1.
Id. cl. 14.
171 Id. cl. 11.
172 Id. cl. 10.
173 Id. cl. 18.
174 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942).
175 See U.S. CONST. amend. V. Citing the Framers' understanding of the special
purposes and background of military justice, the Court has consistently read the Fifth
Amendment Grand Jury Clause's exclusion of military justice as also applying to the
petit jury rights in Article III and the Sixth Amendment. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 2, 123 (1866). According to Justice Davis's opinion for the Court in Milligan,
the Grand Jury Clause provided strong evidence of the Framers' belief that military
discipline called for "other and swifter modes of trial" than those available in civilian
courts. Id. Convening a civilian petit jury for a military infraction would be just as
cumbersome as convening a grand jury, requiring time for jury selection that would
be in short supply under battlefield conditions. Justice Davis therefore inferred that
the Framers also intended to exempt military discipline from the petit jury
requirement; omitting the latter safeguard was functionally consistent with the
rationale for omission of the former. Id.; see also Quirin,317 U.S. at 39-41 (noting long
history of exempting military justice from petit jury requirement). But see Vladeck,
supra note 10, at 952-53 (asserting that the Supreme Court has not provided
persuasive support for its longstanding view of this issue).
169 U.S. CONST. art. I,
170
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C.

The Founding Era and Beyond

Demonstrating this view that military justice was a separate sphere,
the Framers and executive branch officials in the Founding Era including those from the Framers' ranks - permitted procedural
informality in military tribunals that would have been jarring in state
or Article III forums. The accused often lacked counsel, and indeed
court-martial rules often barred counsel from appearing on a
defendant's behalf.17 6 However, that did not mean executive branch
officials were indifferent to the quality of justice provided in military
tribunals. Just the opposite: Both courts-martial and military
commissions, once lawfully established, were tempered by executive
action which was well known to contemporary students of
governance. 177 For example, Madison reviewed the individual records
in courts-martial before determining whether to uphold a sentence,
and occasionally disapproved sentences he felt were too harsh or not
supported by evidence. 178 Monroe did the same, 179 followed in this
respect by John Quincy Adams, who scrutinized court-martial
proceedings with the demanding eye he brought to every task,
including the review of Articles of War initially drafted by his father,
180
John Adams.
This background suggests that the Framers would not have viewed a
requirement that federal courts assume jurisdiction over charges as the
only guarantee of a fair and just result. The Framers were familiar with
historical practice in which decisions within the executive branch had
achieved these virtues without undue judicial intervention. Indeed,
the Framers would have viewed the involvement of federal courts as a
threat to Article III values, inserting federal courts into matters in
which they had little experience or expertise.

176 See Frederick Bernays Wiener, Courts-Martialand the Bill of Rights: The Original
Practice 1, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1958).
177 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 765-68 (1996).
178 Wiener, supra note 176, at 45.
179 Id. at 46-47 (noting that President Monroe sometimes discussed courts-martial
proceedings at Cabinet meetings).
180 Id. at 47-49. President Lincoln followed this practice during the Civil War,

commuting sentences in a substantial percentage of military commission cases. See
Carol Chomsky, The United States-Dakota War Trials: A Study in Military Injustice, 43
STAN. L. REV. 13, 86-90 (1990) (recounting President Lincoln's review of military
commission dispositions concerning members of the Dakota Native American nation
who had allegedly abused captives and targeted civilians); Margulies, Defining and
Punishing, supra note 45, at 44 (noting that executive review by President Lincoln
tempered military commission rulings).
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Historical practice since the early years of the republic harmonizes
with this understanding. Lincoln's Attorney General opined that,
[Tihe President, in passing upon the sentence of a courtmartial ... acts judicially. The whole proceeding, from its

inception, is judicial... [The court-martial] sits to pass upon
the most sacred questions of human rights that are ever placed
on trial in a court of justice ... which must be adjudged
according to law ....When the president ... performs this
duty ...his act has all the solemnity and significance of the

judgment of a court of law. 181
Nothing in the Attorney General's opinion suggested that the judicial
character of a court-martial conflicted with Article III. The Supreme
Court took a similar view, explaining in Runkle v. United States that,
The action [in reviewing a court-martial disposition] required
of the president is judicial in its character, not
administrative ....His personal judgment is required, as

. .

. if

he had been one of the members of the court-martial
itself ....[H]e is the person, and the only person, to whom
has been committed the important judicial power of finally
determining, upon an examination of the whole proceedings
of a court-martial, whether an officer ...

shall be dismissed

182
from service as a punishment for an offence ....

As U.S. military justice has developed, it has ensured procedural
fairness to the accused and insulated judges and fact-finders from
command influence. In establishing procedures governing courtsmartial in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, Congress assured that
"men and women in the Armed Forces do not leave constitutional
safeguards and judicial protection behind when they enter military
service."1 83 That commitment to fairness dovetailed with military
justice's structural value as a means of assuring civilian control.
More than 150 years after the Constitution's enactment, the
Supreme Court during the otherwise salutary Warren Court departed
from this established wisdom about the benefits to constitutionalism
of military justice. While the Warren Court's articulations of principle

181 Attorney General Bates, to Pres. Lincoln, March 12, 1864, 11 Op. Att'y Gen. 21,
cited in Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543, 558 (1887).
182 Runkle, 122 U.S. at 557.
183

Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 194 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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on the Equal Protection Clause18 4 and privacy 185 were on-target, its
protective impulses led it astray in the military justice realm.
D. MilitaryJustice and Former Service-Members
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles186 exemplified the problems with the protective approach. In
Toth, the Court held that Article III and the right to a jury trial barred
a court-martial of the defendant, an ex-service-member, for the alleged
murder of a Korean civilian while the defendant was serving abroad in
the armed forces. Justice Black could have found that these charges,
which involved alleged conduct implicating the global reputation of
the U.S., fit within Congress's authority to "make Rules for the
Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces."18 7 Instead,
Justice Black held that, since the defendant had been discharged from
the armed forces before his deed was detected, court-martial
jurisdiction was unconstitutional. According to Justice Black,
invocation of Article III in Toth and related cases was a bulwark
against "military rule."' 188 Court-martial jurisdiction over ex-service
personnel, even for acts committed while in the service, would invite a
military dictatorship that the Framers would have abhorred, given the
89
millions of U.S. citizens subject to the draft.'
In Toth and his plurality opinion in Reid v. Covert, 190 Justice Black
fundamentally mischaracterized both the English experience with
military justice and the Framers' understanding of that experience.
Justice Black ignored the structural aspect of military justice that had
inspired the English adoption of this approach: its utility in preserving
civilian control of the military. Instead, Justice Black refrained history
to his liking, casting military justice as a categorical threat to civilian
control. 19 1 This led Justice Black to exaggerate the dangers of military

184 See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (striking down racial
segregation in public schools as violation of Equal Protection Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment).
185 See generally Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (finding right to
privacy under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment that barred government
from precluding adults' access to contraception).
186 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
187 U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8, cl.14.
188 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 27 (1957).
189 Id.

190 Id. at 39 (holding that the military could not try the dependent of a servicemember for the alleged murder of her husband).
191 Id. at 23 (viewing court-martial here as a threat to the "tradition of keeping the
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justice and discount the policies favoring military justice in this
context. His eyes unalterably fixed on the slippery slope, Justice Black
put the matter starkly: "Every extension of military jurisdiction is an
encroachment on the jurisdiction of the civil courts, and, more
important, acts as a deprivation of the right to jury trial and of other
' 192
treasured constitutional protections."
In taking this tack, Justice Black badly misread Blackstone. Instead
of recognizing that Blackstone had regarded the Mutiny Act's
establishment of military justice as an essential check on military
encroachment, Black wrongly characterized Blackstone as a critic of
military justice.1 93 Justice Black compounded this misreading by
mischaracterizing the intellectual environment that shaped the
Framers. While the power of the military to try soldiers for offenses
during periods short of hostilities had been firmly established since
the Glorious Revolution, 194 Justice Black wrongly stated that England
had turned to this model during the Framers' lifetimes. 95 Driven by
this misreading, Justice Black then extended to the present day his
anxiety about military justice's domination of civilian authority.
Justice Black's Manichaean vision played out on the slippery slope
that has haunted protective theorists before and since. Justice Black
never explained in concrete terms how the military would charge
substantial numbers of veterans with crimes. Justice Black's dire
scenario would have been plausible only if virtually all servicemembers plotted to commit crimes at the very conclusion of their
tours of duty, and if the military knowingly waited to initiate
prosecution until after such individuals returned to civilian life. Justice
Black never clarified why recruits or draftees would display such bad
timing, or why military justice officials would delay prosecution until
military subordinate to civilian authority"). The holding in Reid itself derives support
from both the functional and protective approaches. A functional analysis would argue
that a service-member's spouse lacks the job-related affiliation with the military that
supplies a basis for court-martial jurisdiction. Moreover, trying military spouses in
military courts and incarcerating them in military prisons might bring discredit to
such institutions, undermining Congress's exercise of its Article I power.
192 Id. at 21.
193 Id. at 23; cf. O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 276 (1969) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (noting, in dissent from the holding that courts-martial could only try
current service-members for offenses committed while in the service that were deemed
to be "related" to their service, that "English constitutional history provides scant
support for the Court's novel interpretation ... and the pertinent American history
proves, if anything, quite the contrary"). The holding in O'Callahan was later
overruled in Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
194 See MACAULAY, supra note 150, at 35-38.
195 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 23.
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after wrongdoers left the service. Perhaps Justice Black believed that
the military would fabricate claims of wrongdoing in an insidious
scheme to imprison millions of veterans. This hypothetical scheme
would have a lot of moving parts. For example, military judges would
have to knowingly collude with military prosecutors in finding
probable cause to prosecute in each of these myriad matters. 196 The
elaborate machinations baked into this scenario show the weakness of
Justice Black's arguments.
Justice Black failed to acknowledge the Article I and other structural
interests served by courts-martial in this context. Under the Necessary
and Proper Clause, Congress is allowed to take steps that are
"conducive" or "convenient" for achievement of goals under Article
1.197 Those goals include deterring crimes by service-members. Black
baldly asserted that the military's interest was not served by
prosecuting ex-service-members. That view failed to reckon with the
ex ante calculations that deterrence seeks to affect. Deterrence works
before the fact; the crucial time for deterrence purposes comes before
an individual commits an act. While deterrence had obviously not
worked for the defendant in Toth, it could well affect the calculations
of others.
Moreover, the prosecutions routed to the federal courts by Toth
were singularly unsuited for such fora. Black's protective stance
obscured the difficulty of reconstructing events in a "disorganized"
theater of war. 198 Military justice can be more expeditious, and could
therefore locate evidence while it is still fresh. A civilian trial, in
contrast, builds in delays that frustrate accountability. Those
Dickensian delays discredit federal courts.
In addition, the accountability offered by military commissions is also
consistent with contemporary human rights initiatives. Holding military
forces worldwide accountable for atrocities is a significant human rights
goal. 199 A workable military justice system fulfills that purpose.
196 See Robinson 0. Everett, Military Jurisdictionover Civilians, 1960 DUKE LJ. 366,
381 (arguing that Justice Black "exaggerated" the risks of military justice).
197 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-34 (2010).
198 See Everett, supra note 196, at 377.
199 See generally Emmanuel Decaux (Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on
the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights), Draft Principles Governing the
Administration of Justice Through Military Tribunals, U.N. Doc. E/CN.42006/58 (Jan.
13, 2006) [hereinafter Principles], available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/
DecauxPrinciples.htmi (presenting principles for the proper administration of military
justice); Gabriela Knaul, (Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and
Lawyers), Independence of Judges and Lawyers, U.N. Doc. A/68/285 (Aug. 7, 2013)
[hereinafter Independence], available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/
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Justice Black also ignored the limiting principle that Congress had
imposed by preserving court-martial jurisdiction only for serious
crimes. 200 This rule deterred the government from enforcing its will by
ginning up petty charges to intimidate domestic opponents among exservice personnel. Congress's rule also preserved accountability of exservice personnel for serious crimes that can place the armed forces in
disrepute, undermine U.S. relationships with allies, and violate the
United States' international law obligations as an occupying power.
Foregoing military jurisdiction would impede accountability; even if a
U.S. civilian court had jurisdiction over such acts, getting evidence
from abroad would be exceptionally difficult. A foreign country might
not have the resources to mount such an effort. Moreover, securing
extradition of the suspect might also be problematic, depending on the
nature of agreements between the U.S. and the country where the
alleged conduct occurred. In other words, rejecting non-Article III
tribunals would not ensure the availability of an Article III forum, or
indeed of any court. In this sense, the Court's zeal to protect Article III
courts elevated form over substance.
E.

Solorio Remedies the Failed Experiment of Service-Connected Crimes

In contrast to the misguided application of the protective approach
in Toth, the Court in Solorio v. United States20 ' displayed a
functionalist focus that dialed back an impractical restriction on
military justice. Solorio overruled the Warren Court's O'Callahan v.
Parker,20 2 in which Justice Black's close ally, Justice William 0.

conference/UNA68-285.pdf (proposing solutions to concerns surrounding the
administration of justice through military tribunals). Professor Vladeck, in his original
and provocative look at military justice, argues that these two reports manifest a
preference for civilian trials of military personnel. See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 9971000. That view of these international law positions does not adequately consider
their context, particularly the fear that military dictatorships abroad will permit their
forces to violate human rights with impunity. The U.S. military justice system, driven
by the importance of civilian control, is a safeguard against impunity. The Decaux and
Knaul efforts actually demonstrate the appropriatenessof U.S. military justice, as long
as the U.S. ensures that its soldiers are accountable.
200 See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 27 (Reed, J., dissenting).
Courts have found a partial "fix" for the problem caused by Toth by upholding the
military's power to recall some former service-members to active duty to prosecute
them for past offenses. See Willenbring v. Neurater, 48 M.J. 152, 169-70 (C.A.A.F.
1998); Vladeck, supra note 10, at 953 n. 138. However, this fix took some time to
work, leaving a significant gap in accountability.
201 Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
202 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
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Douglas, had written for the Court. O'Callahan held that courtsmartial lacked jurisdiction to try current service-members for offenses
that were not "service connected." 203 Justice Douglas's opinion
repeated the mischaracterization of English history and the Framers'
20 4
views that Justice Black had outlined more than a decade earlier.
This mischaracterization drew Justice Harlan's ire. It produced a
cumbersome test that undermined accountability and frustrated
Congress's intent that members of the armed forces uphold the
military's good name. 20 5 Solorio squared the ledger.
The Solorio Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
abolished the service-connection rule, holding that a court-martial had
jurisdiction over the conduct of a member of the Coast Guard who
had sexually abused two young daughters of fellow Coast Guard
members. 206 Channeling Justice Harlan's robust dissent in O'Callahan,
Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that O'Callahan was a failed
experiment based on a misreading of English and American legal
history. 207 Solorio read Article III as permitting court-martial
jurisdiction where a restrictive rule unduly discounted legitimate
208
government interests and failed to provide clear guidance.
The military, Chief Justice Rehnquist realized in Solorio, had a
legitimate interest in signaling that it would hold service personnel
accountable for any crime committed during their service as long as consistent with Toth - defendants were still in the service when
charged. Common sense suggests that even crimes that do not directly
concern military discipline have negative indirect effects that Congress
could legitimately wish to deter through the processes of military
justice. For example, drug offenses committed by service personnel

Id. at 272.
See id. at 269-71.
205 See id. at 281 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the U.S. "has a vital interest
in creating and maintaining an armed force of honest, upright, and well-disciplined
persons, and in preserving the reputation, morale, and integrity of the military
services").
206 See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 436.
207 See id. at 442-44 (finding that O'Callahan's "representation of English
history ... is less than accurate" and that "[tihe history of early American practice
furnishes even less support to O'Callahan'shistorical thesis").
208 See id. at 448 (noting that the "service connection approach... has proved
confusing and difficult for military courts to apply"); cf. Geoffrey S. Corn & Chris
Jenks, A Military Justice Solution in Search of a Problem: A Response to Vladeck, 104
GEO. L.J. ONLINE 29, 36-38 (2015) (noting that Solorio in fact reverted to historical
practice after difficulties engendered by O'Callahan's narrowing of court-martial
jurisdiction).
203
204
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while on leave can undermine the reputation of the armed forces and
subject service-members to blackmail. Drug trafficking or gambling
can create financial pressures that precipitate illicit attempts to gain
funds through service connections. 209 Viewed in this light, any attempt
to neatly separate out service connected from non-service connected
crimes was a futile enterprise. 210 Moreover, a service-connection rule
was actually difficult to administer. The need to make a threshold
determination of service connection necessitated wasteful mini-trials
on factual issues that had to be rehashed later in either military or
civilian tribunals. The service-connection test also led to vexing linedrawing problems that obscured the clear guidance required for
effective discipline. 211 Doing away with the service-connection rule
served the government's legitimate interest in preserving its reputation
and promoting accountability for its own agents. Solorio suggested
that a rigid interpretation of Article III unduly interfered with those
goals and with the Framers' vision of a workable government.
Protective theorists have mounted a counter-attack on Solorio by
invoking international law.2 12 However, the protective theorists have
misread international law's teachings. That misreading echoes Justice
Black's misreading of English history and the Framers' intent. Recent
reports on military justice commissioned by United Nations bodies
have performed a valuable service in outlining best practices for
military justice around the world. Those reports respond to serious
problems reflected in many nations that lack the subordination of the
military to civilian control typified by the United States. In countries
characterized by military domination of civilian authority, military
justice lacks fair procedures and accountability for human rights
209 See United States v. Trottier, 9 MJ. 337, 350 (C.M.A. 1980) (noting that
"almost every involvement of service personnel with the commerce in drugs is 'service
connected"'), cited in Solorio, 483 U.S. at 450 n.17.
210 See Solorio, 483 U.S. at 448-50.
211 See id. Admittedly, in some cases lines were relatively easy to draw. For
example, as Justice Stevens noted in his concurrence in Solorio, a service member's
sexual abuse of a fellow service member's children surely qualified as serviceconnected. See id. at 451. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court remedied the
systemic issues with the service connection rule, even though a narrower holding
would have been sufficient to uphold Solorio's conviction. Cf. Diane H. Mazur,
Rehnquist's Vietnam: Constitutional Separatism and the Stealth Advance of Martial Law,
77 IND. L.J. 701, 752-53 (2002) (noting the possibility of a narrower holding in Solorio
and suggesting problems with Chief Justice Rehnquist's broader vision of civilianmilitary relations, while conceding the appropriateness of deference to military
judgments on the scope of court-martial jurisdiction over active-duty military
personnel).
212 See Hafetz, supra note 10, at 712; Vladeck, supra note 10, at 997-1000.
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abuses. 213 Moreover, in some states military tribunals regularly try
civilians,21 4 such as dissidents who oppose military rule. To remedy
these problems, the recent reports recommend fair procedures, limits
on the military trial of civilians, and - to ensure accountability for
human rights abuses - non-military trials for members of the armed
forces accused of violations of human rights. Limits built into U.S.
military justice, including the overarching principle of civilian control,
deal with these issues.
While each of the U.N. reports recommends that civilian courts try
charges of "[olrdinary criminal offences" by military personnel, 215 the
more detailed of the two reports concedes that this recommendation is
lexferenda - a hope expressed for the law's future trajectory - rather
than lex lata - law that is currently binding. These recommendations
claim no support in treaties, and the more detailed of the reports
acknowledges that customary international law ("CIL") similarly
offers no support. 216 As students of international law know, CIL
requires support from two sources: opinio juris (state opinion that a
given norm is binding) and state practice (actions that implement
these norms). 217 The 2013 Knaul report commissioned by the U.N.
Human Rights Council concedes that "many military justice systems"
regard an ordinary crime committed by a service-member, such as "a
rape or a theft," as "no less a breach of discipline than a purely
military offence such as insubordination or disobedience." 218 That

concession showed that state practice favors broad military tribunal
jurisdiction over active-duty personnel. Knaul rightly noted a trend in
state practice toward limiting military tribunals to "criminal offences

213 See Eugene R. Fidell, Criminal Prosecution of Civilian Contractors by Military

Courts, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 845, 847-48 (2009) (quoting U.N. body as implying that
military tribunals in some countries lack fair procedures).
214

Id.

Knaul, Independence, supra note 199, 1 99; see Decaux, Principles, supra note
199, Principle No. 8, Functional Authority of Military Courts ("J]urisdiction of
military courts should be limited to offences of a strictly military nature committed by
military personnel.").
216 See Knaul, Independence, supra note 199, 1 160-61.
217 See Vijay M. Padmanabhan, Separation Anxiety? Rethinking the Role of Morality
in International Human Rights Lawmaking, 47 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 569, 576 (2014)
("[C[ustomary law exists where there is demonstration of uniform, extensive, and
widespread state practice and evidence of a sense of legal obligation.").
218 Knaul, Independence, supra note 199, '161.
215
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and breaches of military discipline."' 219 That state practice is squarely
220
in line with Solorio's holding.
The U.N.-sponsored reports also reveal a concern with
accountability for human rights abuses that is largely irrelevant to the
U.S. experience, given the United States' structural commitment to
civilian control. To "combat impunity," 22 1 the reports recommend that
civilian authorities try service personnel accused of human rights
abuses. 222 In countries dominated by the military, bolstering the
civilian justice system in this fashion is sensible, since military
tribunals may cover up human rights violations. However, in a system
like the U.S. characterized by civilian control and robust constitutional
guarantees of individual rights, these concerns are less germane.
Despite the protective school's efforts to marshal U.N.-sponsored
reports, the U.S. commitment to civilian control and swift, sure, and
fair military justice is largely consistent with the U.N.-sponsored
reports' tone and tenets.
F. Civilian Contractors
Today's military justice bone of contention concerns military
contractors. Contractors have purposefully affiliated themselves with
the military and obtained benefits from that affiliation. When
contractors provide assistance abroad during wars or occupations,
they implicate the same reputational interests as service-members:
Id. 62.
To their credit, protective theorists concede that the recent U.N.-sponsored
reports are not a "comprehensive summary of existing international law norms."
Vladeck, supra note 10, at 999; see also Hafetz, supra note 10, at 712 (acknowledging
that recent U.N.-sponsored reports "may not yet embody customary international law").
221 Knaul, Independence, supra note 199, ' 64.
222 Id. T1 64-66. The European Court of Human Rights has suggested that military
tribunals require safeguards against command influence that may be more robust than
those provided in U.S. courts-martial. See Martin v. United Kingdom, App. No.
40426/98, 1 49 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 24, 2006) (noting problem that finders of fact in
United Kingdom military tribunal were subordinate to officer who ordered that
tribunal be convened), available at .http://hudoc.echr.coe.intL/fre?i=001-77661#.
However, as the court acknowledged, its concerns occurred in the context of the trial
of a civilian dependent of a service member, in which, as in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1,
39 (1957), concerns about independence of the military tribunal are at their zenith.
Cf. Martin, App. No. 40426/98, 1 44 (observing that such cases required "particularly
careful scrutiny"). Whatever the concerns in Martin about a military tribunal's
independence, the court did not suggest that military tribunals lacked jurisdiction to
try service-members for all criminal offenses allegedly committed while the defendant
was in the armed forces. In this sense, Martin is consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Solorio.
219
220
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populations abroad expect the U.S. to deter misconduct and hold
contractors accountable just as would be done for ordinary servicemembers. 223 Indeed, the capacity to deter misconduct abroad by
individuals who serve alongside the U.S. military is also an
indispensable element of the United States' compliance with
international law: a nation engaged in armed conflict or occupation
abroad must ensure that it avoids purposely inflicting harm on civilian
persons or property abroad. 224 It must also punish its agents for
infliction of such harm.
History provides evidence that courts-martial can try sutlers and
others who accompany and take direction from armed forces in the
field. 225 The Continental Congress passed such a law, 226 as did
227
In a recent case, 228
legislatures after the Constitution's enactment.

the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces ("CAAF") found that a
court-martial could try a contract interpreter who was a dual Canadian
and Iraqi citizen for an assault on another Iraqi interpreter committed
while both were assisting U.S. forces in Iraq.
The protective approach would reject this holding. For the
protective camp, the civilian status of the contractors is determinative,
regardless of the national interests furthered by court-martial
jurisdiction. Here again, the protective camp unduly discounts
legislative interests in holding contractors to the same standards as
U.S. troops, and exaggerates the danger of civilian courts in allowing
court-martial jurisdiction.
While Congress may have other means available for enforcing
discipline among contractors, these means are flawed. The Military
Extraterritorial Justice Act ("MEJA"), 229 has an important exception: it
does not permit jurisdiction over nationals of the country hosting the
223

See generally GEOFFREY

CORN, JIMMY GURULE, ERIC JENSEN & PETER MARGULIES,

(Aspen Press, 2015).
See Adam Roberts, Transformative Military Occupation:Applying the Laws of War

NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 323
224

and Human Rights, 100 AM.J. INT'L L. 580, 585-87 (2006).
225 See Glazier, supra note 10, at 19 (indicating that sutlers were merchants who
sold liquor, coffee, and similar items to troops in the field during wartime); cf. Reid v.
Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957) (acknowledging precedent for court-martial of sutlers
and others accompanying military in time of war); Perlstein v. United States, 151 F.2d
167 (3d Cir. 1945) (upholding court-martial of civilian contractor for theft during
wartime operations in Africa).
226 See Edmund M. Morgan, Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Non-Military Persons
Under the Articles of War, 4 MINN. L. REV. 79, 89 (1920).
227

See id. at 90.

228

United States v. Ali, 71 M.J. 256 (C.A.A.F. 2012).
18 U.S.C. §§ 3261-67 (2012).
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military. 230 Courts-martial are necessary for filling that gap. Moreover,
even if MEJA were available, the extra layer of deterrence provided by
the availability of a Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ")
proceeding would still support Congress's power to provide for courtsmartial. If only one type of proceeding were available to prosecute an
alleged wrongdoer, that individual might bet on his or her odds for
evading punishment. However, jurisdictional "redundancy" - the
availability of multiple sources of prosecution - narrows the odds of
impunity. This decreased chance at impunity might well shape a
prospective wrongdoer's ex ante calculus, making it more likely that
the prospective wrongdoer would comply with legal norms.2 3' As an
exercise of Congress's power under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
this added layer of deterrence would certainly be "conducive" to
Congress's achievement of its Article I goals, and would therefore be
232
appropriate under the Necessary and Proper Clause.
To understand the stakes in court-martial jurisdiction over
contractors, it is worth noting disagreement among members of the
CAAF panel on the rationale for upholding court-martial jurisdiction.
The majority of the panel, in an opinion by Judge Erdmann, upheld
court-martial jurisdiction on the sweeping ground that Ali was not a
U.S. citizen. 233 In contrast, Judge Baker relied on a functional factor: a
contractor's purposeful affiliation with the U.S. military. 234 According
230 Ali, 71 MJ. at 280 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3267(l)(C), (2)(C)).
231 Professor Huq has argued that a regime characterized by jurisdictional
redundancy in fact reduces marginal deterrence. See Aziz Z. Huq, Forum Choice for
Terrorism Suspects, 61 DUKE LJ. 1415, 1491-92 (2012). Professor Huq analogized the
provision of multiple forums for adjudication of wrongdoing to the failure to employ
graduated penalties that rise with the severity of wrongdoing. See id. However,
Professor Huq's argument lacks empirical support on its own terms, and may in any
case be faulty as an analogy. In some cases, lawmakers may believe that a wrongful act
above a certain threshold merits severe punishment, with additional wrongdoing
above that point leading to only marginal increases in punishment. For example,
lawmakers typically provide severe penalties for premeditated murder, and
prosecutors add counts in the case of multiple homicides. Lawmakers in this situation
may believe that murder of a single person merits severe punishment, or they may
believe that an individual sufficiently depraved to commit a single murder will not be
deterred even if the penalty for multiple murders is materially greater. Moreover, it is
far from clear that jurisdictional redundancy functions in the same way as uniformly
severe penalties. A prospective wrongdoer may view jurisdictional redundancy as
increasing the odds of a successful prosecution, and may be deterred because of this
increase in the likelihood, rather than the degree, of punishment. Professor Huq's
analysis did not address this possibility.
232 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-34 (2010).
233 See Ali, 71 MJ. at 266-68.
234 See id. at 272-75.
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to Judge Baker, Congress's war powers were ample to support court
martial jurisdiction, in light of the importance of maintaining
discipline among both members of the armed forces and contractors
accompanying them. 235 The outcome was right, and Judge Baker's
rationale appropriately stressed the functional element in his analysis.
Here, too, protective theorists seek to brandish international law to
resist the functional view. However, international law provides even less
support here than it does on the question of military tribunals'
jurisdiction over service-members' ordinary crimes. 236 One of the U.N.sponsored reports cited by protective theorists actually supports military
tribunals' jurisdiction over civilian contractors in wartime, given
contractors military "function." 23 7 The other report acknowledges that
the accountability of civilians is appropriate in "exceptional"
circumstances 238 and recommends that "thought... be given" to
accountability for personnel "assimilated" into the military such as
contractors. 239 Neither report supports the rigid distinction between
service-members and contractors insisted on by protective theorists.
G.

MilitaryJustice and Article III Appellate Review

One of the most prominent academic commentators on non-Article
III tribunals, Professor Richard Fallon, has suggested that appellate
24 0
review by an Article III court would cure any constitutional defects.
Professor Fallon's appellate review model is an appealing paradigm. It
permits Congress wide discretion in initial procedures for adjudicating
claims outside Article III, as long as determinations in non-Article III
forums are reviewed by Article III courts. Highlighting the virtues of
Professor Fallon's approach, Justice O'Connor asserted in Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agricultural Products Co. that appellate review by an
235

See id. at 276.

236

See supra notes 212-22 and accompanying text.
See Knaul, Independence, supra note 199, '1 102. However, Knaul read necessity

237

more strictly than a functional analysis would. See id.
238 See Decaux, Principles, supra note 199, 9120.
239 Id. 1131. In Martin, the European Court of Human Rights expressed "doubts"
about military jurisdiction over service-members' dependents, where the functional
justifications for such jurisdiction are far less compelling. See Martin v. United
Kingdom, App. No. 40426/98, 9l 45 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Oct. 24, 2006). However, Martin
also favorably cited a British House of Lords decision finding such jurisdiction lawful.
Id. Martin did not purport to address the issue of jurisdiction over military contractors
abroad, where the functional position is strongest. But see Fidell, supra note 213, at
856-57 (arguing that courts-martial should rarely, if ever, try civilian contractors, and
expressing strong preference for use of civilian tribunals).
240 See Fallon, Legislative Courts and Article III, supra note 12, at 916.
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Article III court is one factor among several that may validate a
legislative scheme. 241 Unfortunately, Professor Fallon's model is not
well-suited to the singular demands of military justice.
As Justice Kennedy indicated in Loving v. United States, the Framers,
many of whom had acquired military experience in the Revolutionary
War and elsewhere, appreciated the importance of military
discipline. 242 That appreciation extends to both members of the
political branches, who exercise command and oversight
responsibilities over the military, and uniformed commanders. An
Article III judge may be insufficiently attuned to the need for military
discipline, precisely because of the protections that insulate the judge
from the gritty realities of the purse and the sword. That remoteness
may injure the cause of civilian control over military affairs.
Consider the question of accountability for sexual assaults in the
military.2 43 An Article III appellate judge might emphasize the rights of
the accused, to the detriment of victims' welfare and overall discipline.
If a non-Article III judge sitting on the CAAF makes this mistake, the
political branches and commanders know that the judge will be
replaced after a maximum of fifteen years. However, the political
branches and commanders have no such assurance for Article III
judges. As a result, it may be more difficult to dislodge a harmful or
oppressive status quo.
These costs may seem diffuse in contrast with the ready appeal of
the appellate review model, but the costs are real. Nothing in Article
III requires Congress to forego the flexibility provided by non-Article
III tribunals in implementing Congress's war powers. Indeed, this
flexibility echoes the virtues that Justice Harlan praised in territorial
courts. 244 In addition, as the sexual assault example illustrates,
241 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 592 (noting that the
statute "limits but does not preclude review.., by an Article III court"). Proceedings
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") are reviewable by the Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces ("CAAF"), a respected court that nonetheless does not
meet Article III requirements, since its members receive only a fifteen-year term.
Parties losing before the CAAF may appeal via certiorari to the Supreme Court, but
the Court can deny certiorari and typically does in CAAF cases. On the other hand,
military commission proceedings are appealable first to a non-Article Ill court, the
Court of Military Commissions Review ("CMCR"), and then directly appealable as of
right to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. So, military commission cases satisfy the
appellate review test. Protective theorists would view appellate review as necessary,
but not sufficient. See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 1000.
242 See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 765 (1996).
243 See Loretta Sanchez, The Forty-First Kenneth J. Hodson Lecture in Criminal Law,
218 MIL. L. REV. 265, 269-71 (2013).
244 See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 545-47 (1962); supra notes 85-93
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appellate review by a non-Article III tribunal can better equip the
civilian sector to impose its policies on the military. Civilian control
over the levers of power sends a strong structural message that
reinforces constitutionalism.
IV.

MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND ARTICLE III

The law on military commissions and Article III is more uncertain
than the law on military justice. However, military commissions also
clearly implicate Congress's war powers, including the Make Rules
Clause and the Define and Punish Clause. Moreover, commissions are
appropriate in situations where more formal Article III proceedings
would be "impracticable and anomalous." 245 As a limiting principle,

we can require that military commissions try only charges based on
246
conduct that is reasonably related to violations of international law.
Military commissions borrow the same functional rationale that
legitimates courts-martial. While courts-martial can occur with respect
to our forces at any time, war or peace, commissions hold belligerents
accountable for conduct in an armed conflict with the United States.
The more formal appurtenances of a civilian trial are especially
inappropriate in this setting. Military commissions, as we shall see,
often occur where civilian courts would be manifestly anomalous: in
the course of conflicts abroad, involving foreign nationals with no
previous connection to the United States. One can also argue that the
structural rationale for commission jurisdiction is derivative of the
structural rationale for courts-martial: U.S. armed forces need a system
of military justice with streamlined procedures to keep them in check.

and accompanying text.
245 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990).
246 Compare Kenneth Anderson, What to Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda
Terrorists?: A Qualified Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on
Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 591, 613-20

(2002) (arguing that military tribunals comply with international law), and Scott L.
Silliman, ProsecutingAlleged Terrorists by Military Commission: A Prudent Option, 42
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 289, 294-97 (2009) (arguing that commissions are a practical

alternative to Article Ill courts), with David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al
Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 1033 (2009) (arguing that
military commissions cannot lawfully try defendants for certain offenses not
recognized under international law), Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging
War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1308 (2002)
(arguing against the legality of the Bush administration's unilateral creation of military
commissions), and Diane F. Orentlicher & Robert Kogod Goldman, When Justice Goes
to War: Prosecuting TerroristsBefore Military Commissions, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

653, 656-57 (2002) (expressing concerns about command influence in commissions).
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It would be anomalous to provide foreign enemies with greater legal
protections.
A.

A Typology of Military Commissions

The history of military commissions dates back at least as far as the
war for independence against Great Britain. In the Revolutionary War,
General Washington convened a military commission to try Major
John Andre, who had been captured behind American lines in civilian
garb after a meeting with General Benedict Arnold, whom Andre was
persuading to defect to the British. 247 In his opinion for the Court in
Quirin, Chief Justice Stone cited the commission that tried and
convicted Major Andre as a building block in the Framers' functional
view of the need for swift justice in wartime.
Commissions come in three varieties, which have different
implications for Article III. Andre's commission was a "law of war"
commission, which tries enemy belligerents in an armed conflict for
violations of the law governing such conflicts. 248 In contrast, a martial

law commission supplants civilian courts in the U.S. by trying
ordinary crimes in areas riven by an armed conflict, such as the Civil
War. An occupation commission serves in place of civilian tribunals
abroad, in an area occupied by U.S. forces. The three factors cited in
this Article - Congress's Article I powers, structural concerns, and
limiting principles - play out differently in the martial and
occupation settings on the one hand, and the law of war commission
on the other.
The presence vel non of a limiting principle is salient for martial law
commissions, which by their nature would occur within U.S. territory
and thus could adversely affect U.S. citizens. As the Supreme Court
recognized in the landmark case of Ex parte Milligan,249 martial law
commissions pose the greatest dangers for Article III. Without a strict
limiting principle, a martial law commission could try U.S. citizens for
virtually any crime, thus eviscerating the protections of judicial
independence written into Article III, the jury trial right included in
that Article, and the grand and petit jury guaranteed respectively by

247 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 31 n.9 (1942); 1 HALLECK'S INTERNATIONAL LAw: OR,
RULES REGULATING THE INTERCOURSE OF STATES IN PEACE AND WAR 574 (Sherston Baker

ed., 3d ed. 1893), available at httpJ/archive.org/stream/hallecksinternaOOsirgoog#page/
n5/mode/lup.
248 See Vladeck, supra note 10, at 945.
249 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
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the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. 250 In deriving a limiting principle,
Milligan noted that the petitioner was a civilian residing in Indiana.
The petitioner was not a participant in the Civil War, even though he
had been accused of conspiracy to overthrow Indiana's lawful
government. 25' Milligan's civilian status precluded the exercise of
jurisdiction by a "law of war" commission. A martial law commission
was out of bounds, the Court opined, because its jurisdiction was
predicated on strict necessity, and in Indiana the civilian courts were
open. 252 Under the circumstances, the Court ruled, depriving Milligan
of a grand jury, jury trial, and the independence of an Article III
tribunal would violate the Constitution.
Milligan's limiting principles of belligerency and necessity
substantially defused the systemic threat to Article III posed by
military commissions. Barring the recurrence of an epic domestic
conflict like the Civil War, it would seem unlikely that masses of U.S.
citizens or residents would serve as belligerents opposed to the U.S.
government. Military commissions for civilians would therefore be
barred as long as civil courts were open and functioning.23 However,
dissipation of the wholesale threat of military government across vast
stretches of the U.S. does not eliminate the threat of incursions on
Article III that are smaller in scope. For example, U.S. citizens or
residents could enlist as belligerents for a foreign power. Addressing
those situations requires a more searching look at "law of war"
commissions.
B.

Law of War Commissions

With law of war commissions, it is best to start with our first factor:
Congress's Article I powers. The power of Congress to establish law of
war of commissions involves three separate sources of constitutional
power and limitation. We have already identified the first two: Article
III and Congress's Article I war powers, including its power under the
Define and Punish Clause 25 4 to define and punish violations of
international law. This particular source of authority is important

250
251

See id. at 119.
See id. at 121-22 (noting that Milligan was a "citizen in civil life, in nowise

connected with the military service").
252

See id. at 121.

See Michael W. Lewis & Peter Margulies, Interpretations of IHL in Tribunals of
the United States, in APPLYING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN JUDICIAL AND
253

QUASI-JUDICIAL BODIES
254 U.S. CONST. art.

415, 422 (Philip Van Tongeren ed., 2014).
1, § 8, cl. 10.
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because the Supreme Court, in Ex parte Quirin, suggested without
conclusively deciding that the "law of war" was largely international in
character. 25 5 An express constitutional limit on Congress also plays a
role: the Ex Post Facto Clause, 25 6 which requires that Congress
provide fair warning through a duly enacted statute that certain
conduct is criminal. The D.C. Circuit's decision in al Bahlul II is the
first decision to hold that a law of war military commission conviction
that is valid under the Ex Post Facto Clause is barred by Article 111.257
Before we grapple with how both Article III and the Ex Post Facto
Clause play out in al Bahlul's case, some background is useful on the
Framers' understanding of Congress's power under the Define and
Punish Clause.
C. The Define and Punish Clause and the Deference That Is Congress's Due
The Framers inserted the Define and Punish Clause in the
Constitution because unredressed violations of international law by
individual states had been a prime weakness in the Articles of
Confederation period. 258 The Define and Punish Clause gave Congress
the power to enact laws that criminalized conduct such as violations of
the international law principle of diplomatic immunity, which had
sparked tensions with European powers prior to the Constitution's
enactment. 259 The Framers were also well aware of the commentary by
Vattel and other publicists on international law, which had emerged as
a check on the arbitrary power of European monarchs and therefore

255 The Court's language is ambiguous about the precise source of the authority to
establish military commissions: it alluded to "Congress ... making rules for the
government of our Armed Forces," but also highlighted the Define and Punish Clause
and the relationship between the "rules and precepts" of the law of nations and the
content of the law of war. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942). As we shall see,
those "precepts" of international law could include a measure of deference to states in
how they define international law.
256 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.
257 Al Bahlul 11, 792 F.3d 1, 3-22 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
258 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 716-17 (2004); Golove &
Hulsebosch, supra note 45, at 934; Margulies, Defining and Punishing,supra note 45, at
19-20; cf. Curtis A. Bradley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article 111, 42 VA.J. INT'LL. 587,
640-41 (2002) (questioning importance of incidents such as Philadelphia attack on
French diplomat Marbois); J. Andrew Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power to
Define and Punish Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 874-88
(2007) (same).
259 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716-17.
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dovetailed with the 0Framers' interest in building a sound
26
constitutional republic.
At that time, most international law was not codified in treaties;
rather it was customary in nature, evolving in accordance with state
opinion and practice. This capacity for change and development was a
virtue of international law, but also required fine-tuning to ensure that
the new republic's interests dovetailed with its legal obligations. As
Judge Janice Rogers Brown pointed out in her concurrence in the D.C.
Circuit's en banc opinion in Al Bahlul v. United States,
[TIhe Framers were distinctly aware of the undefined and
adaptable nature of international law. They also recognized the
concomitant flexibility inherent in that law. And they
understood that the United States could, and indeed should,
make use of that flexibility to advance its own national
[T]he Framers intended the United
security interests ....
- to act in its own self-interest,
nations
other
like
States 26
of international law. '
constraints
flexible
the
albeit within

Carving out that space for flexibility within constraints required some
measure of deference for Congress's determinations. The Necessary
and Proper Clause 262 provided additional authority for Congress to
legislate with flexibility in this area, without undue fear of judicial
second-guessing.
The Framers' consigning to Congress of the task of defining and
263
The
punishing violations of international law had functional roots.

See 3 EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL
ch. 8, § 137 (1758), available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/vatt308.htm; Golove & Hulsebosch, supra note 45, at 967; Margulies, Defining and
Punishing, supra note 45, at 12-14.
261 Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d 1, 54 (D.C. Cir. 2014); cf. id. at 59, 62 (citing Margulies,
Defining and Punishing, supra note 45). Judge Henderson made a similar point in her
insightful dissent in al Bahlul II about the deference the Framers believed was owed to
Congress. See Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 44 (observing that, under Define and Punish
Clause, "Congress was not reflexively to follow other nations' lead in formulating
[international law] offenses but instead to contribute to their formulation" (citing
Margulies, Defining and Punishing, supra note 45, at 27)); see also David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb - Framing the
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 734 (2008)
(observing that "Congress's power to 'define and punish... Offences against the Law
of Nations' gives the legislature substantial authority to decide what conduct violates
international law").
262 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 18.
263 The discussion in the next two paragraphs relies heavily on the account
provided in Margulies, Defining and Punishing, supra note 45, at 24-28.
260
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Framers repeatedly acknowledged that international law was fluid and
reliant on a bewilderingly vast constellation of state opinion and
practice. 264 Indeed, Madison observed, even the "most enlightened
legislators" could not state its boundaries with precision. 265
Reinforcing the need for deference to Congress's judgments, Madison
invoked the language of the Necessary and Proper Clause, maintaining
that the need for uniformity and predictability made it "in every
respect necessary and proper" to afford Congress a measure of
discretion in carving out international law's contours. 266 Heavyhanded attempts by the courts to curb this flexibility would make it
more difficult to navigate the ship of state. Viewed in this light,
judicial restraint would serve structural values, keeping courts out of
the turbulent waters of diplomacy and statecraft. 267
264 See THE LAW PRACTICE OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON, supra note 45, at 361
(predicting, in notes for a brief in Rutgers v. Waddington, the gradual extension of the
"principle of... amnesty" in international law that would resolve property disputes
after peace treaty in favor of bona fide purchasers).
265 See THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(describing difficulty of "delineating the several objects and limits of different codes of
laws... [including] common law ... land] maritime law"). Deference is also a staple
of tribunals, such as the European Court of Human Rights, when interpreting
transnational human rights agreements. See Handyside v. United Kingdom, 24 Eur.
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 47, 52 (1976) (furnishing a "margin of appreciation" to a state ban
of a book on sexuality that publishers had marketed to teenagers); see also Robert D.
Sloane, Human Rights for Hedgehogs?: Global Value Pluralism, International Law, and
Some Reservations of the Fox, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 975, 983 (2010) (explaining that the
measure of deference provided by the margin of appreciation grants states the
flexibility to "implement or interpret human rights in ways that may be sensitive or
responsive to prevailing social, cultural, and other norms within their polities").
266 See THE FEDERALIST No. 42, at 266 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
267 This wariness about judicial intrusion in foreign affairs has led the Supreme
Court to curb human rights litigation in U.S. courts concerning overseas conduct
unrelated to the United States. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol Petroleum Co., 133 S.
Ct. 1659, 1664-65 (2013) (construing the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS") under the canon
of statutory interpretation disfavoring extraterritorial application of statutes). Scholars
have disagreed on the judicial role under the ATS. Cf. Ingrid Wuerth, Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co.: The Supreme Court and the Alien Tort Statute, 107 AM. J. INT'L L.
601, 606-12 (2013) (analyzing the opinions of the justices in Kiobel). Compare Ernest
A. Young, Universal Jurisdiction, the Alien Tort Statute, and Transnational Public-Law
Litigation After Kiobel, 64 DUKE L.J. 1023, 1041-43 (2015) (discussing the potential
disruption of foreign affairs caused by ATS litigation and other uses of universal
jurisdiction), with Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100 YALE
LJ. 2347, 2399 (1991) (arguing for a heightened judicial role in vindicating human
rights norms). In Kiobel, the Supreme Court put Congress in the driver's seat, since
Congress can enact legislation giving the federal courts a larger role in human rights
lawsuits. Since Congress is accountable to the people, it is appropriate to give
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The Framers' intent to neutralize the risk of uncertainty in
international law through reliance on Congress also influenced the
drafting of the Define and Punish Clause. At the Constitutional
Convention, Gouverneur Morris of New York successfully argued that
the language of the Clause should expressly empower Congress to
268
"define," as well as punish, offenses against the law of nations.
Morris explained that the writings of philosophers and accounts of
state opinion and practice that made up the law of nations would
prove "too vague and deficient to be a rule." 269 Congress would
remedy this problem by not merely defining the law of nations in a
mechanical fashion, but refining that occasionally turgid and murky
stream of disparate sources. When the operation of a rule lacked
predictability and manageability, Congress could supply those
attributes. Moreover, if parties with parochial agendas, including
foreign states or other entities, precipitously claimed that the law of
nations had changed, relying on Congress to set a rule would prevent
270
an unduly hasty shift in abiding principles.
By the same token, allowing Congress a measure of flexibility
promotes growth and change in international law itself. Customary
international law is not static; it evolves through state practice. 27' Giving
Congress a voice in that evolution is consistent with the Framers' wish
that the U.S. take its place among the community of nations.
Nineteenth-century precedents echoed this tendency to defer to
Congress's Article I power. Echoing Madison, Justice Story suggested in

Congress power over a matter impinging on the nation's sovereign prerogatives. In
one recent case, the Supreme Court has ruled that a statute concerning foreign affairs
was invalid because it conflicted with the constitutional power over recognition
exercised by the executive branch. See Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2080
(2015); cf. id. at 2086 (recognizing that "functional considerations," including the
President's ability to act with "dispatch," undergird viewing President's recognition
power as exclusive, not shared with Congress (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424
(Alexander Hamilton))). However, Zivotofsky concerned a dispute between the two
political branches over foreign affairs. In contrast, curbing Congress's flexibility under
the Define and Punish Clause expands judicial power at the expense of both political
branches.
268 See 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 614-15 (Max
Farrand ed., 1966); cf. Kent, supra note 258, at 899 (discussing exchange).
269 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 268, at 615.
270 Cf. Kent, Congress's Under-Appreciated Power, supra note 258, at 899 (arguing
that Morris might have thought that "Congress should not be bound by anyone else's
view but its own as to whether an offense [against the law of nations] had been
committed by another state").
271 See Wuerth, supra note 267, at 621 (citing the continuing role of state practice
in the development of international human rights litigation).
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United States v. Smith272 that the Framers lodged in Congress the power
to define offenses against the law of nations because they recognized
that the law of nations could not be "completely ascertained and
defined." 273 In United States v. Arjona,274 the Court upheld Congress's
power under the Define and Punish Clause to prohibit the
counterfeiting of foreign currencies. The Court did not cite any treaties
or state practice on this issue, which in fact had drawn a conspicuous
silence from these sources. 275 Instead, the Court reasoned from the
structure and purpose of international relations, citing the need to
276
maintain the integrity of the global financial system.
D. Ex parte Quirin and the World War II Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court did not address the impact of the Define and
Punish Clause on law of war commissions until the World War II case
of Ex parte Quirin.277 In Quirin, Chief Justice Stone wrote for the Court
in upholding military commission convictions of Nazi saboteurs.
Central to Chief Justice Stone's analysis was Congress's authorization
of military commissions in that case.2 78 Chief Justice Stone listed all of

Congress's Article I war powers as well as the President's Commander
in Chief authority under Article 11.279 He acknowledged that
272

18 U.S. 153 (1820).

Id. at 159. The Supreme Court declined to defer to Congress in another piracy
case decided contemporaneously with Smith. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 184, 194-99 (1820) (holding that although Congress had the power to
criminalize robbery on the high seas as piracy, it lacked the power to criminalize
murder on the high seas not involving a U.S. national or vessel). However, Furlong's
rejection of congressional power to criminalize the more serious offense of murder is
an outlier in both the jurisprudence of the Define and Punish Clause and international
law. See infra notes 373-78 and accompanying text.
274 United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887).
275 Cf. Thomas H. Lee & David L. Sloss, InternationalLaw as an Interpretive Tool in
the Supreme Court, 1861-1900, in INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THE U.S. SUPREME COURT:
273

CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 124, 147-48 (David L. Sloss, Michael D. Ramsey & William

S. Dodge eds., 2011) (noting that the Arjona Court relied largely on Vattel and policy
arguments, and did not cite treaties, state practice, or other publicists besides Vattel).
276 Arjona, 120 U.S. at 484.
277 Exparte Quirin 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
278 See id. at 26. It is arguable that Congress had not expressly authorized
commissions, since the provision cited by the Court was best viewed as a savings
clause stating only that the legislation did not preclude military commissions that were
otherwise lawful. See Margulies, Defining and Punishing,supra note 45, at 49; Stephen
I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military Jurisdiction,4J. NAT'L
SECURITY L. & POL'Y 295, 315-16 (2010) (discussing ambiguities in the statute).
279 See Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25-26.
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Congress's power to establish military commissions is an "important
incident to the conduct of war." 280 Citing the Define and Punish

Clause in particular, he noted that Congress had established military
commissions to try belligerents who, "in their attempt to thwart or
281
impede our military effort have violated the law of war."

Chief Justice Stone did not venture a comprehensive or precise
definition of the "law of war." He included references to international
law 282 and examples from U.S. practice, including Major Andre's
proceeding during the Revolutionary War, 283 General Winfield Scott's
convening of commissions during the Mexican-American War, 284 and

the holding of commissions during the Civil War. 285 Given Congress's
involvement, Chief Justice Stone disavowed an unduly "meticulous"
286
demarcation of the law of nations' "ultimate boundaries."
This deferential stance toward Congress suggests that the Court
favored a broad definition of the "law of war" in determining
Congress's power to establish military commissions. Defining that
term was crucial to determining whether the defendants' convictions
were legal under the Ex Post Facto Clause, since the Articles of War
then in effect did not specify particular conduct that was prohibited,
but simply authorized commissions to try violations of the "law of
war." The Court's articulation of the law of war violation in Quirin
supplies further evidence of its deference to Congress. The defendants
had in fact made little if any concrete progress in their aim to destroy
military objectives within the United States. 287 The Court could have
Id. at 28.
281 Id. at 28-29.
280

284

See id. at 29-30.
See id. at 31 n.9.
See id. at 31 n.10.

285

See id. at 31 & n.10;

282
283

cf. JOHN FABIAN WITT, LINCOLN'S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN

(2012) (discussing military commissions); Haridimos V. Thravalos,
History, Hamdan, and Happenstance: "Conspiracyby Two or More to Violate the Laws of
War by Destroying Life or Property in Aid of the Enemy," 3 HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 223, 25263 (2012) (discussing the William Murphy military commission).
286 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 45-46.
those who had sought to alert the
287 Id. at 38. Ultimately, two of the defendants FBI of their plans - were pardoned; the rest were executed. Adding to the
controversy around the decision, the executions occurred before the Court's full
decision explaining its rationale, although the Court had earlier issued a per curiam
decision that allowed the commissions to proceed. For different views of the case,
compare A. Christopher Bryant & Carl Tobias, Quirin Revisited, 2003 Wis. L. REV. 309
(contending that Quirin, along with changes in the law of habeas corpus, provides
significant protection for defendants in military tribunals), with Jonathan Turley,
Tribunals and Tribulations: The Antithetical Elements of Military Governance in a
AMERICAN HISTORY
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found that a law of war violation required the actual destruction of
property or harming of persons. Instead, the Court found that the
defendants' offense was "complete" and therefore triable under the law
of war once the defendants entered and remained in the U.S. without
enemy uniforms for the purpose of committing acts of sabotage. 288
The Court's need in Quirin to address the Ex Post Facto issue
created ambiguity about the relationship of Article III to law of war
commissions. Chief Justice Stone did not clarify whether Article III
imposed any requirements beyond those imposed by the Ex Post Facto
Clause. Language from the opinion and material from Chief Justice
Stone's personal papers suggests that Article III's role had to be read in
light of the importance of Congress's Article I interests, the President's
Article II interests as Commander in Chief, and the exigencies
surrounding the convening of commissions. 289
According to the Quirin Court, the exigent circumstances
surrounding military commissions' use suggested their structural
virtues and the risks to federal courts of undertaking a similar task.
Chief Justice Stone alluded to the practical impediments to civilian
courts trying participants in the midst of an armed conflict. He
observed that military commissions established to try members of an
adversary's forces are "in the natural course of events ...

usually

called upon to function under conditions" that ruled out "familiar
parts of the machinery for criminal trials in the civil courts." 290
Because commissions have often been conducted under exigent
circumstances, Chief Justice Stone indicated that such circumstances
"preclud[ed] resort" to juries and other attributes of civilian trials.291
Based on this factor and historical practice, the Court declared that
military commissions were simply not "courts in the sense of the
Judiciary Article" of the Constitution. 292 This invocation of practical
factors suggests the need for a measure of deference under Article III
to Congress's determination of what conduct is triable in military
commissions.

MadisonianDemocracy, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 649, 735-39 (2002) (criticizing Quirin).
288 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 38; cf. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 559 (2006)
(plurality opinion) (citing the holding in Quirin with approval). Importantly, the
Quirin Court did not find that the defendants could be charged with treason, which
would require a trial in federal court. See U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 3, cl. 1.
289 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-27; see also infra notes 293-96 and accompanying text
(discussing ChiefJustice Stone's papers).
290Quirin, 317 U.S. at 26-27.
291 Id.
292 Id.
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Unpublished exchanges between the Justices also indicate that the
Court intended to take a deferential stance toward both Congress and
the President for reasons rooted in practicality and exigency. Chief
Justice Stone and Justice Frankfurter engaged in correspondence on
the President's compliance with the appellate procedures in Article 46
of the Articles of War. 293 Both Stone and Frankfurter appeared to

acknowledge that President Roosevelt had not complied with the
literal commands of the statute. The statute required review of a
verdict and sentence by the Judge Advocate General or some delegate
of the President prior to review by the President himself. The latter
had occurred, but not the former. Justice Frankfurter pronounced
himself willing to grant the President, working in partnership with
Congress, some discretion to interpret a statute on wartime tribunals.
This discretion, according to Justice Frankfurter, was squarely based
on functional factors such as the importance of military commissions
to the war effort, and the prospect that an unduly rigid judicial reading
of authority for commissions could undermine commissions'
effectiveness. Justice Frankfurter argued that courts had routinely
deferred to the President on mundane matters such as "tariff
legislation and land laws." 294 If that were true, Frankfurter continued,

[B]y much greater and controlling reason should the
Presidential construction of a military code reasonably or
historically permitting such construction be accepted as
binding upon the courts. The ultimate Constitutional basis of
the President's right in utilizing an instrument like the...
Military Commission is his power as Commander-in-Chief to
conduct the war. In the very nature of things, therefore,
legislation bearing on the exercise of this military power - the
actual combative aspect of war - is peculiarly outside the
expectancies of judicial review. 295
A suggested insertion by Chief Justice Stone does not rely as heavily
as Frankfurter on deference to the President, but suggests that Stone
would defer in the appropriate case to the combined judgment of the
President and Congress. The insertion observed that, "it would be
gratuitous ... to inquire whether Congress could restrict the authority

of the Commander in Chief to discipline enemy belligerents, or to
293 See Papers of Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, Box 69, Library of Congress

[hereinafter Stone Papers] (copy on file with the author).
294 Felix Frankfurter, Sept. 14 Letter to Harlan Fiske Stone at 5-6, Stone Papers,
supra note 293.
295 Id.
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consider the role of the courts if he were to ignore such restriction." 296
The published opinion took a minimalist stance that did not
contradict Justice Frankfurter's view, explaining that the President's
"[o]rder convening the Commission was a lawful order and.., the
Commission was lawfully constituted; that the petitioners were held in
lawful custody and did not show cause for their discharge." 297 At the
very least, this minimalist account suggests no disagreement with the
proposition that the Court should defer to the combined judgment of
the political branches.
The teachings of practicality are even more evident in another case
based on belligerents' conduct during World War 1I, Johnson v.
Eisentrager.298 Justice Jackson, perhaps the Court's most influential
analyst of the separation of powers, 299 wrote for the Court. In
upholding commission convictions based on the defendant German
nationals' continuing to fight for Japan in the Pacific theater after
Germany had surrendered, Justice Jackson relied in part on the need,
in a former theater of war outside of the territorial U.S., to try
defendants who were "nonresident enemy aliens who at all times have
remained with, and adhered to, enemy governments."' 300 Justice
Jackson cautioned against providing "enemy aliens, resident, captured
and imprisoned abroad, with standing to demand access to our
courts." 30 1 While Justice Jackson's argument may be seen as turning

on the petitioner's legal status vel non under U.S. immigration and
nationality law, the argument at its core sounds in the key of
practicality. Justice Jackson stressed the difficulty of enforcing the full
array of U.S. legal protections for a foreign national when a panoply of
factors counseled against that move. For Justice Jackson, the factors
counseling judicial restraint included the following: the foreign
national had engaged in armed conflict with the U.S. under the
direction of a foreign power, "has never been or resided in the United
States ...

was captured outside of our territory and there held in

296 See Preliminary Version of Quirin Opinion at 30, Stone Papers, supra note 293.
In a letter to Frankfurter, Stone expressed tempered approval of Frankfurter's position
on deference to the President. See Letter from Chief Justice Stone to Justice Felix
Frankfurter, Sept. 16, 1942, at 1-2, in Stone Papers, supra note 293. Stone agreed with
Frankfurter that the President had "pre-existing power" to decide on the procedure
for executive review of commission verdicts, and that Congress had not clearly stated
that it was restricting the President's power. Id. at 2.
297 Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48.
298Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
299 See Barron & Lederman, supra note 261, at 693.
300 Eisentrager,339 U.S. at 769.
301 Id. at 777.

20151

Justice at War

military custody as a prisoner of war... tried and convicted by a
Military Commission sitting outside the United States... for offenses
against laws of war committed outside the United States ...and is at

302
all times imprisoned outside the United States."
In Eisentrager, the practical difficulties of access to evidentiary
proceedings in U.S. civilian courts were a special concern. Justice
Jackson noted that,

[Such access] might mean that our army must transport
[foreign nationals without U.S. ties] across the seas for
hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space,
guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It might also require
transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to
call as well as transportation for those necessary to defend
303
legality of the sentence.
Justice Jackson warned that because this broad right of access to
U.S. civilian courts "would be... available to enemies during active
hostilities ... [s]uch trials would hamper the war effort and bring aid

and comfort to the enemy." 304 Regarding such a prospect as injurious
to the war effort, Jackson stressed the difficulties such wartime
proceedings might pose for a U.S. commander, who would be
"effectively fetter[ed]" by a reading of the Constitution that would
"allow the very enemies [the commander] is ordered to reduce to
submission to call [the commander] to account in ...civil courts and
divert ... efforts and attention from the military offensive abroad to
30 5

the legal defensive at home."
Justice Jackson's analysis made two points, one express and one
implied, regarding the need for deference to Congress's power to
establish commissions. First, because of the practicalities that Jackson
identified, resort to more formal tribunals could impair the war effort.
Second, Jackson implied that the federal courts' undertaking of this
task would disserve structural values, because Article III tribunals'
stumbling would redound to their discredit. 30 6 Both Jackson and Stone

302

Id.

303
304

Id. at 779.
Id.

305

Id.

While both Chief Justice Stone and Justice Jackson discussed the difficulties
adjudication, it is fair to say that military commissions after 9/11 have
with Article III
also encountered difficulties. See Hafetz, supra note 10, at 721-22. One can attribute
some of those difficulties to the "false start" commissions encountered when the
Supreme Court rightly found that President George W. Bush's unilateral establishment
306
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left ambiguity on the role in Article III analysis of international law
and the law of war. It is to that question that we now turn, in search of
a limiting principle.
E.

Post-9/11I Issues: Conspiracy and Article III

In Al Bahlul v. United States, a panel of the D.C. Circuit addressed
the question that Quirin and Eisentragerleft for future cases: whether
Article III imposes any requirements on law of war commissions. We
will assume that a law of war commission, to be true to its category,
can only adjudicate cases involving belligerents in armed conflicts. 307
The next question is whether that is a sufficient restraint, or whether
Article III requires a nexus between commission charges and
international law. This section argues that because Congress is entitled
to deference under Article III, commissions can try charges with a
reasonable relationship to international norms. The conspiracy
charges in al Bahlul's case met that standard. In holding that Article III
required more literal adherence to the letter of international law, the
D.C. Circuit in al Bahlul II failed to afford Congress the appropriate
deference due under the Necessary and Proper Clause. To reach that
point, however, the court had to address the issue of whether al Bahlul
had forfeited his right to de novo review of his Article III challenge.
Since the issue of forfeiture also sheds light on the importance of
Article III challenges, I turn to that issue first.
1.

Forfeiture of Article III Challenges to Military Commissions

There are strong competing arguments on whether al Bahlul
forfeited his right to raise his Article III argument. The full D.C.
Circuit had earlier found that he had forfeited his right to de novo
review of his Ex Post Facto Clause challenge to his conviction. 308 Al
Bahlul argued that his objection dealt with the underlying structure of
the tribunal, and thus was always reviewable de novo at a court's
option, even if he had failed to make the argument below. On remand
from the en banc court, a D.C. Circuit panel agreed, with Judge Rogers

of commissions conflicted with congressional intent. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S.
557, 624 (2006). However, at some point in the near future, military commissions will
need to demonstrate that they can produce dispositions in an effective, fair, and just
manner.
307 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 45 (1942). Milligan tells us that this is true for
commissions that deal with a domestic conflict, such as the Civil War, at least if those
commissions operate when civilian courts are open.
308 Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d 1, 8-10 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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writing the majority opinion. 309 Judge Henderson, in dissent, argued
that al Bahlul's objection was not to a commission's subject matter
jurisdiction, which an appellate court may always review, but was
instead to Congress's power to establish commissions and authorize
commissions to try certain offenses.310 Typically, Judge Henderson
noted, parties can forfeit their right to de novo review of such issues,
allowing the court to dispose of them under a far more deferential
plain error standard. Although the arguments are almost in equipoise,
Judge Rogers was correct: the presence of structural factors and the
importance of guidance on the type of tribunal that will try conspiracy
cases in the future weigh against forfeiture and favor de novo review.
The argument for forfeiture here is that al Bahlul attempted to
boycott his military commission proceeding and failed to articulate his
Article Ill-based objection. Generally, such a failure would be a
forfeiture of this right to assert this point on appeal. A reviewing court
would thus forego de novo review, and uphold the conviction unless it
constituted plain error. 311 Finding a forfeiture stems from two related
policies: (1) the failure to object deprives the court below of the
opportunity to consider the legal issue, reducing judicial economy,
and, (2) enforcing forfeitures prompts diligence by parties below, who
might otherwise give less than their "all" in the knowledge that they
3 12
could always raise new issues on appeal.
To preserve his or her rights, a defendant must object with sufficient
specificity to alert the trial court about the nature of his objection, and
allow the trial court to analyze the objection concretely. 31 3 While al
Bahlul did object to the proceedings before the military commission,
his objection was arguably too vague to satisfy the specificity standard.
Al Bahlul argued that the military commission was an illegitimate
tribunal. 314 However, al Bahlul did not specifically raise the Article III
point before the military commission. His objection was more
amorphous, and could well have extended to trial before any U.S.
court, including an Article III forum. An objection that broad would
ordinarily be considered a forfeiture that precluded de novo review.
Courts will typically enforce forfeitures of this kind unless the
challenge goes to the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction,315
309 Al Bahlul I1,792 F.3d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
310 Id. at 27-28.
311 United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631-32 (2002).
312 See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134 (2009).
313 See United States v. Bolla, 346 F.3d 1148, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
314 Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
315 See Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631.

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 49:305

retroactive interference by Congress with final judicial decisions, 3 16 or

3 17
the composition of a tribunal that presided over the hearing below.

Forfeiture is per se inappropriate only in cases concerning subject
matter jurisdiction. In such cases, a trial court must always consider
objections sua sponte, if a party fails to raise them, since the court
lacks authority to adjudicate the case. In the other situations described
above, a court may engage in de novo review, although it could also
rule that a party had forfeited the right to mount a challenge. In that
event, a court would review only for plain error.
Here, the military commission clearly had subject matter
jurisdiction. Congress had conferred jurisdiction over members of Al
Qaeda engaged in armed conflict with the United States. 318 Al Bahlul
clearly fit under this rubric, given undisputed evidence that he had
been a close aide to Osama bin Laden and al Bahlul's statements when
acting as his own counsel that he had sought to kill Americans on Al
Qaeda's behalf.3 19 A commission would have lacked subject matter
jurisdiction if al Bahlul had been in Milligan's shoes - a U.S. citizen
who was not a belligerent in the armed conflict. In contrast, al Bahlul's
status as a belligerent aiding Al Qaeda sufficed to provide the
320
commission with subject matter jurisdiction.
Since Congress had not attempted to retroactively interfere with
final judicial decisions, the next question would be whether al Bahlul's
challenge concerned the composition of a tribunal. The propriety of a
tribunal's composition, including the role of non-Article III judges
sitting in an Article III forum, is often called "structural" in nature. 321
The Court has engaged in de novo review of decisions in the course of
exercising its supervisory power over Article III courts. For example,
the Court has reviewed decisions by Article III courts regarding which
official can perform adjudicative functions. In Nguyen v. United
States,322 the Court held that it would violate Article III to have a nonArticle III territorial court judge sit on a panel reviewing a criminal
conviction, when that conviction had occurred in an Article III forum.
See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995).
See Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 78 (2003).
See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 948b(a) (2015) (providing that MCA
grants military commissions power to "try alien unprivileged enemy belligerents for
violations of the law of war and other offenses triable by military commission"); In re
AI-Nashiri, 791 F.3d 71, 73-75 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (discussing the statute).
319 Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 5, 21-22.
320 Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 27-28 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
321 Id. at 3-4 (majority decision).
322 Nguyen, 539 U.S. at 80.
316
317
318
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Since such issues can recur, providing guidance to lower courts
promotes the sound functioning of the federal court system. A party's
forfeiture of the right to seek de novo review does not reduce the value
of the Court playing its supervisory role. The supervisory rationale
may also account for the Court's decision in Wellness Int'l Network,
Ltd. v. Sharif,323 in which the Court appeared to review de novo
whether a party's consent to bankruptcy court adjudication helped to
cure a possible Article III problem. The Court took this step, even
though the party challenging the adjudication had arguably forfeited
324
his challenge to bankruptcy court adjudication.
However, the Court is not obliged to take this course. One fair
reading of the majority's decision in Sharif is that a party can both
waive and forfeit structural objections. Justice Sotomayor, who wrote
for the Court, indicated that a party could "waive" structural
objections. 325 The Sharif Court's primary analysis distinguished
between a waiver, which it viewed as an affirmative consent to an
adjudication, 326 and a forfeiture, which could result from the failure to
timely raise an issue. 327 However, other passages from the opinion
blurred this distinction. For example, Justice Sotomayor approvingly
cited a passage from Justice Scalia's opinion in Plaut v. Spendthrift
Farm, Inc., 328 in which Scalia observed in the context of the affirmative
defense of res judicata that, "the proposition that legal defenses based
upon doctrines central to the courts' structural independence can
never be waived simply does not accord with our cases." 329 Justice
Scalia's logic permitting structural waivers also applies to forfeitures,
since in analyzing res judicata issues waiver and forfeiture are largely
interchangeable: a court will construe a failure to timely assert the
defense as a waiver.330

323 See Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1941, 1947, 1949 (2015).
324 Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 727 F.3d 751, 755 (7th Cir. 2013).
325 Sharif, 135 S.Ct. at 1947 n.l (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211, 231 (1995)).
326 Id. at 1942-44.
327 Id. at 1941 & n.5.
328 514 U.S. 211, 231 (1995).
329 Id.
330 See Daubert v. McCollum, No. CIV-14-555-D, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53489, at
*23 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 25, 2015) (noting that under state law, failure to timely assert
claims in direct appeal of criminal conviction constitutes waiver in petition for habeas
corpus); North East Marine, Inc. v. Boody, No. 09-CV-5600 (CBA), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 139607, at *51 (E.D.N.Y. July 5, 2012) (failure to file timely objection may
constitute waiver); Whallon v. City of Houston, No. 01-11-00333-CV, 2015 Tex. App.
LEXIS 1157, at *11 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. Feb. 5, 2015) (noting that res judicata is an
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Justice Sotomayor's opinion in Sharif contains another hint that the
Court regarded structural claims as forfeitable. The Sharif Court
remanded to the lower court to determine "whether" Sharif had
forfeited his objection to bankruptcy adjudication of his adversary's
claim. 33 1 If Article III objections are per se non-forfeitable, this remand
would have been superfluous, since Sharif as a matter of law could not
have forfeited his objection. A remand to assess whether a party's
omissions amounted to forfeiture makes sense only if, on some set of

332
facts, forfeiture would have been possible as a matter of law.

Moreover, one can argue that the Article III challenge here is actually a
challenge to Congress's power to legislate. A party can forfeit the right
to de novo review of such a challenge, just as a party can forfeit the
right to challenge other claims about the power of Congress. 333
The judicial economy and party diligence-promoting rationales of
forfeiture rules are at their height where, as in al Bahlul, the defendant
largely boycotted the proceedings below. 334 In such a case, the lower

court has been deprived of any opportunity to consider the defendant's
arguments. That obliges the appellate court to do all the work - a
burden that the defendant could have spared the court if the defendant
had asserted his arguments below. In addition, in "boycott" cases,
courts promote their institutional interest in an adversarial process by
sending a clear message to litigants about the adverse impact of a
failure to participate in proceedings below.
Having noted this, it remains true that the Supreme Court has
usually opted to engage in de novo review of structural arguments,
even when defendants arguably forfeited the right to de novo review.
A critical mass of Justices often feels that addressing these issues
provides institutional guidance that is valuable, even when individual
affirmative defense that is considered waived unless pleaded in timely fashion).
331 Sharif, 135 S. Ct. at 1948-49. The Court remanded on both forfeiture and
"knowing and voluntary consent" to bankruptcy adjudication. Id.; see also Al Bahlul II,
792 F.3d 1, 33-34 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Sharif
stands for the proposition that a party can forfeit structural argument); Sharif, 135 S.
Ct. at 1949 (Alito, J., concurring) (arguing that Sharif had forfeited his claim by failing
to present it below).
332 See, e.g., B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1304
(2015) (holding that a party forfeited its right to claim an Article III violation by
conceding the point earlier in the litigation); see also infra notes 339-43 and
accompanying text (further discussing B & B Hardwareand suggesting that the Court
actually reached the merits).
333 See Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 27-28 (Henderson, J., dissenting). For example, a
criminal defendant could by the failure to make a timely objection forfeit the right to
de novo appellate review of whether a statute violated the First Amendment.
334 Id. at 41.
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parties raising the issues have been nonchalant regarding their rights.
In Nguyen v. United States,335 the Court held that a defendant's failure
to lodge a timely objection did not preclude review of the defendant's
argument that the presence of a non-Article III judge on a panel
reviewing his conviction violated Article 111.336 Justice Stevens, writing

for the Court, drew support from Justice Harlan's opinion in Glidden
Co. v. Zdanok.337 In Zdanok, Justice Harlan pressed on to the merits
despite the absence of a timely Article III objection to trials in the
District of Columbia presided over by retired judges of the Court of
Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.338 Justice
Harlan's example suggests that functionalists should grapple with
structural questions de novo, instead of relying on the plain error
standard. The Court's decision in Sharif echoes this practice, by
reaching the merits of the Article III argument de novo, although the
Court also suggested that such an argument is forfeitable.
Another recent decision, B & B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
Inc.,339 appeared to enforce a forfeiture, but still reached the merits
after a fashion and thus provided sufficient guidance for future cases.
In B & B Hardware,Justice Alito wrote for the Court, asserting that a
company had forfeited the right to de novo review of an Article III
challenge to a statute that gave collateral estoppel effect to decisions
by an administrative agency. 340 However, although Justice Alito found
that the party had forfeited this argument, his finding that the
avoidance canon did not apply in essence addressed the Article Ill
issue. The avoidance canon holds that a court should interpret a
statute to resolve serious questions about the statute's
constitutionality.34 1 In finding that the avoidance canon did not
require reading the statute to avoiding giving agency decisions issuepreclusive effect, Justice Alito cited Supreme Court precedent
presuming that Congress intended that a party can invoke collateral
estoppel based on an agency decision. 342 That line of precedent
335 539 U.S. 69 (2003).
336

Id. at 78.

337 370 U.S. 530, 547 (1962).
338 Id. at 535-36 (citing the "strong policy concerning the proper administration of

judicial business"). After exhaustive analysis, the Court concluded that the courts in
question were actually Article III courts with the judicial protections befitting that
label. Id. at 556-61.
339 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015).
340 Id. at 1304.
341

342

Id.
Id. at 1304-05 (citing Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99 (1986)).
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discussed at length the efficiency achieved by lending agency decisions
preclusive effect and the folly of a formalistic rule that limited issue
preclusion to court decisions. 343 While Justice Alito did not purport to
definitively resolve the Article III objection to granting agency
decisions preclusive effect, his discussion indicated that such
objections would face an uphill battle.
In light of this judicial bent for addressing structural questions, the
al Bahlul II majority was correct to engage in de novo review of the
Article III challenge. Judge Rogers was right that setting the contours
of military commission authority is a vital task in ascertaining the role
of the judiciary as an institution. 344 Addressing whether Congress can
provide an alternative to Article III adjudication of certain criminal
charges is surely as important as determining whether a federal court
can allow a judge of the federal Court of Claims to try federal criminal
cases, which the Court ruled on in Zdanok, or allow a judge of a
territorial court to hear appeals from an Article III trial court, as the
Court declined to do in Nguyen. The system works best if military
commissions have that guidance in future cases. A de novo standard is
most appropriate in light of that need.
2.

Understanding Conspiracy in International Law

Conspiracy charges can arise in two ways. 345 First, international
tribunals recognize that a plot resulting in a completed, unlawful act
of violence, such as murder, amounts to conspiracy. Here, conspiracy
is not a crime in and of itself. It is merely a theory of responsibility
supporting a murder charge. 346 The prosecutor's theory is that an
individual who plots a killing is as guilty as the individual who pulls
the trigger.
International law views conspiracy as criminal only when it constitutes
a theory of responsibility for a completed war crime. In contrast,
international law does not recognize conspiracy as a separate, inchoate
offense entailing a mere agreement between individuals. The murder of
civilians is a completed act that would suffice as a matter of law. In the
United States, however, a defendant can be guilty of conspiracy to rob a
bank if that individual and others agree to commit the robbery and that
individual then takes even a minor step in furtherance of that agreement,
343

Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 797 (1986).

344 Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 8-9 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
345 This subsection relies on CORN ET AL., supra note 223, at 313-14.
346 See Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment,
14 393-95 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007).
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such as visiting the bank to assess its security. 347 Conversely,
international tribunals do not recognize an agreement without a
completed act as a war crime, reasoning that such an offense would be
too vague. 348 No international tribunal has tried an individual who merely
plotted to kill civilians unless others have killed the civilians and the
349
individual's plot has aided or facilitated the killing.
3.

International Tribunals on Conspiracy as a Form of Liability

In cases where the killing of civilians has occurred, international
tribunals will broadly construe the assistance, including conspiracies
among individuals, that supports the charge of murder. One of
international criminal law's prime objectives is the elimination of
impunity - a wrongdoer's evasion of punishment. Courts recognize that
the murder of civilians often entails assistance in varying forms provided
by many individuals, each eager to minimize or deny his or her role. A
broad definition of culpable assistance promotes accountability for those
who aid in the commission of such serious crimes.
For example, treaties and case law indicate that a conviction for
murder of civilians could be based on a defendant's aiding and abetting
the killing or participation in a Joint Criminal Enterprise (JCE) to
commit the killing. To be guilty of the murder of civilians based on a
JCE theory, an individual need only serve as a "cog in the wheel" for a
common plan. 350 To be guilty of aiding and abetting, a defendant need
not have prior knowledge of a specific act of violence. A defendant need
only provide help, including moral encouragement, with the knowledge
351
that those receiving the help are targeting civilians.

347 For a landmark federal case on conspiracy doctrine, see Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S 750, 773-74 (1946) (holding that defendants can be guilty of
conspiracy if they agreed to commit acts that were unlawful and acted to further that
goal, even if each defendant did not know all or even most of the other defendants in
the alleged conspiracy).
348 See Jonathan A. Bush, The Prehistory of Corporations and Conspiracy in
International Criminal Law: What Nuremberg Really Said, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1094,
1162 (2009); Margulies, Defining and Punishing, supra note 45, at 87.
349 See CORN, ET AL., supra note 223, at 314.
350 Prosecutor v. Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, '1 199
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 15, 1999); see Prosecutor v. Taylor,
Case No. 03-01-T, P6910-11, 1 464 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone 2012).
351 Prosecutor v. Sainovi6, Case No. IT-05-87-A, Appeals Chamber Judgment, 91
1629 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 23, 2014).
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JCE is substantially equivalent to conspiracy as a theory of liability
for completed war crimes. 352 Similarly, aiding and abetting, JCE, and
conspiracy overlap. Suppose an individual recruits others with the
intention that the recruits will murder civilians. If the murder actually
occurs, the recruiter would be guilty of that murder on either a JCE or
aiding and abetting theory. 353 An individual who drives a truck that
transports civilians to a killing site with the intent that such killing
will occur is similarly guilty of murdering civilians, on either a JCE or
aiding and abetting theory. 354
4.

Analyzing Conspiracy in al Bahlul

We can analyze conspiracy for Article III purpose in al Bahlul's case
in two ways. First, we can look at the underlying conduct in the case.
The en banc D.C. Circuit took this step in finding that al Bahlul's
conviction did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, while the panel of
the D.C. Circuit that decided on remand that his conviction violated
Article III ignored al Bahlul's conduct. As the en banc D.C. Circuit
recognized, while the initial charge in al Bahlul's case was based on his
agreement and did not require a completed act, overt acts cited in the
charges "directly relate[d]" to the 9/11 attacks. 355 Members of the
352 See Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-A, at c19 393-404 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
for the Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2007) (discussing Nuremberg conspiracy cases
brought under Control Council Law No. 10); Prosecutor v. Rwamakuba, Case No.

ICTR-98-44-AR72.4, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding Application of Joint
Criminal Enterprise to the Crime of Genocide, Appeals Chamber, 9124 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for Rwanda Oct. 22, 2004) (also discussing Nuremberg conspiracy cases under
Council Law No. 10); cf. Jens David Ohlin, Joint Intentions to Commit International
Crimes, 11 CHI. J. INT'L L. 693, 703 (2011) (describing "close connection" between
conspiracy and JCE).
353 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(3)(b)-(d), July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 105 (describing types of criminal liability, including soliciting,
aiding and abetting, and any other knowing or intentional contribution to the actual
or attempted commission of a crime by a group of persons acting with a common
purpose).
354 See Prosecutor v. Kvoeka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, Cf 298 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001) (stating that aiding and abetting would
only require knowledge, not intent).
355 Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014); Margulies, Defining and Punishing,
supra note 45, at 83-84, 86-87. Similarly, the instructions of the military judge to the
members of al Bahlul's military commission allowed the members to find that al
Bahlul had participated in acts related to September 11. The judge first informed the
members that they did not need to find that the conspiracies with which al Bahlul had
been charged, such as plotting to murder civilians during an armed conflict, had
actually resulted in the deaths of civilians. See Transcript of Record at 848, United
States v. Al Bahlul, 803 R.M.C., Office of Military Comm'n, Dep't of Defense, available

20151

Justice at War

military commission found that al Bahlul had committed those acts.
Those findings, confirmed by al Bahlul's own admissions, supplied the
one element -

relationship to a completed war crime -

that separated

the stand-alone conspiracy charge in al Bahlul's case from
internationally recognized6 conspiracy as a theory of responsibility for
35
the murder of civilians.
The undisputed evidence includes the following: Although al Bahlul
did not have advance knowledge of the attacks, a letter from al Bahlul
introduced into evidence admitted that his conduct was related albeit in a "simple" and "indirect" way - to 9/11. In the letter, al
Bahlul admitted one of the overt acts cited in the charges:
administering an al Qaeda loyalty oath to two key participants in the
9/11 plot - Mohamed Atta, the plot's ringleader in the United States,
and Ziad Jarrah, one of the pilots. 357 Evidence also showed that al

at http://www.mc.milVPortals/0/pdfs/alBahluVBahlul%20Transcript.pdf. However, the
judge also instructed the members that they needed to find that al Bahlul had
committed at least one of the overt act acts specified. Several of those acts dealt with
September 11, such as the specifications that al Bahlul had prepared martyr wills for
two of the key 9/11 hijackers, Mohamed Atta and Ziad Jarrah. Id. at 847. In addition,
the military judge's instructions on each of the specific charges appeared to allude to
completed acts, such as the actual murder of civilians. In his instructions on overt
acts, the judge noted that an overt act "must be a clear indication that the conspiracy
is being carried out." Id. at 849 (emphasis added). The phrase, "being carried out,"
suggests a plot that was at least partially consummated. Moreover, six times during
instructions on the specific charges, the judge informed that the members of the
commission that they had to find that the "intended killing" or other violation "took
place" during an armed conflict. See id. at 850 (discussing charges of murder of and
attack on civilians) (emphasis added); id. at 852 (giving instructions on attacking
civilian objects); id. at 852-53 (providing instructions on murder in violation of the
law of war); id. at 854 (providing instructions on conspiracy to destroy property in
violation of the law of war); id. at 856 (providing instructions on conspiracy to
commit terrorism). The phrase, "took place," would be incongruous if the judge's
instructions dealt only with unconsummated plots. By the same token, the phrase fits
actions, such as the September 11 attacks, that in fact occurred. Those completed
violations of international law were integral to the conspiracy charges against al
Bahlul, just as they would have been in an international tribunal determining al
Bahlul's guilt.
356 AI Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 21 (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633
(2002) (describing evidence as "essentially uncontroverted")). The Military
Commissions Act provides the accused with robust protections regarding access to
evidence. See Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(A) (2012) (allowing
the accused to present evidence in his or her defense, cross-examine adverse
witnesses, and "examine and respond to" evidence introduced by the prosecution). In
capital cases, the statute also provides that the accused will be represented by at least
one lawyer "learned in applicable law relating to capital cases." Id. §
949a(b)(2)(C)(ii).
357 Gov't's Motion for Preadmission of Evidence (Letters of the Accused) at 4,
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Bahlul administered the oath with the intent that Atta and Jarrah
would kill American civilians. 358 Moreover, acting as his own attorney
during the trial, al Bahlul acknowledged that his administration of the
loyalty oath linked him to the 9/11 plot. The members of the military
commission specifically found that al Bahlul had administered the
loyalty oath.359 That finding would support JCE and aiding and
abetting liability for murder, given the broad definitions used in
international tribunals. In this respect, al Bahlul's conduct fit within
the acts that international law authorizes for trial in military
commissions. 360 That link to conduct that violates international law
should be sufficient to satisfy Article III.
One can also argue that for Article III purposes, even an inchoate
conspiracy to murder civilians is reasonably related to international
law. Here, we would look to the Necessary and Proper Clause, which
would permit Congress to enact legislation "conducive" to exercise of
its Article I powers. 361 There is no doubt that Congress could punish
an internationally recognized war crime, such as the murder of
civilians. Under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Congress could also
punish plots that could have led to the murder of civilians or another
recognized war crime, even when authorities thwarted such plots
before their completion. Congress could reasonably find that waiting
for a completed act poses too great a risk, and that the prospect of
military commission prosecution would enhance deterrence. 362
United States v. Al Bahlul, Before the Military Commission, available at http://www.
mc.millPortals/0/pdfs/alBahlu/Al%2OBahlul%20(AE035).pdf; see Margulies, Defining
and Punishing, supra note 45, at 86.
358 Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d at 21.
359 Id. at 22.
360 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 78-79 (1857). The same analysis would
apply to the material support charges in al Bahlul's case. The D.C. Circuit found that
these charges violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d. at 29. One can
argue, pace the D.C. Circuit, that an appropriately tailored charge of material support
would include only conduct that constituted JCE or aiding and abetting under
international law, and would thus be entirely appropriate for trial in commissions.
361 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-34 (2010) (citing McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 413, 418 (1819)); cf. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 413 (defining

necessary as "convenient ... or useful").
362 Congress's power to prospectively (as opposed to retroactively) designate
crimes as triable in military commissions is also at issue in the case of Abd al Hadi alIraqi, who allegedly engaged in a range of pre-MCA conduct but also is accused of
conspiracy for post-MCA events. In al-Iraqi's case, that alleged post-MCA conduct
involved making false statements to Turkish officials and in immigration documents
in 2006 to enable the defendant to enter Iraq to plan attacks on U.S. troops there. See
Charge Sheet at 12, Abd al Hadi al-Iraqi (June 2, 2014), available at
http://www.mc.milVPortals/0/pdfs/allraqi/Hadi%20A%201raqi%2OReferred%2OCharge
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In addition to promoting Congress's exercise of its Article I powers,
this formulation serves other structural ends. Trying such cases will
often involve defendants, evidence, and witnesses located abroad,
challenging the capacities of Article III courts. Trying such charges in
a military commission makes sense.
This functional approach is also consistent with Ex parte Quirin. As
noted above, Chief Justice Stone's opinion in Quirin stressed
Congress's war powers. 363 Moreover, Chief Justice Stone expressly
declined to offer an unduly "meticulous" analysis of the interaction
between Congress's authority to establish military commissions and
the parameters of the law of war. 364 In furnishing examples of offenses

against the law of war, Chief Justice Stone cited to both international
law scholars and U.S. history. 365 Chief Justice Stone also stressed the
practical difficulties with requiring that a civilian court, with its more
elaborate procedures, adjudicate conduct that occurred in the fluid
realm of an armed conflict. 366 Finally, the Quirin Court's holding is
consistent with a deferential view of Congress's authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause. A military commission trial was not
strictly "necessary" for the Quirin defendants, whom U.S. authorities
had apprehended within the U.S. for acts committed here. In 1942,
despite the United States's entry in World War II, civilian courts in the
U.S. were open. Nonetheless, the Court clearly viewed a military
"conducive" and
commission trial as more efficient and therefore more
"useful" to Congress's exercise of its war powers. 367

%20Sheet.pdf. According to the U.S., participants in those attacks would have feigned
civilian status, thus violating the international law prohibition on perfidy. The alleged
conspiracy involved mere agreement, not a completed act, since al-Iraqi was captured
before the plan could be consummated. Al Iraqi's commission prosecution would also
satisfy Article 1l, as being reasonably related to an acknowledged war crime.
363 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25-28 (1942).
364 Id. at 45-46.
365 Id. at 30-31.
366 Id. at 39.
367 United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 133-34 (2010). While Judge Tatel's
concurrence in Al Bahlul II suggested that Article III courts are also capable of
adjudicating cases of transnational terrorism involving defendants with no previous
ties to the U.S., Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 23, 27 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Tatel, J.,
concurring), his analysis compared apples and oranges. A substantial number of the
cases successfully prosecuted in Article III courts involved defendants arrested in the
U.S. through sting operations. CTR. ON LAW AND SEC., TERRORIST TRIAL REPORT CARD:
SEPTEMBER 11, 2001-SEPTEMBER 11, 2011 26 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2011) (stating
that fully 41 percent of criminal prosecutions involved informants to recruit
individuals in the U.S. for terrorist "plots" created by law enforcement), available at
http://www.lawandsecurity.org/Portals/0/Documents/fTRC%2Ten%2OYearo/o20lssue.
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The Supreme Court's latest decision on military commissions, Hamdan
v. Rumsfeld,368 is also consistent with a functional analysis that would
defer to Congress's war powers and uphold al Bahlul's conviction. Justice
Stevens wrote for a plurality in asserting that inchoate conspiracy was not
a war crime. 369 This section of Stevens' opinion stressed the perils of
unilateral executive establishment of military commissions. The distrust
of executive unilateralism dominated the portions of the opinion that a
majority of the Justices endorsed. In keeping with this focus on executive
unilateralism, Justice Stevens expressly reserved whether Congress - as
opposed to the President acting in the face of legislation to the contrary
- could designate conspiracy for trial in commissions. 3 70 Highlighting
the Hamdan Court's hesitancy to tie Congress's hands, Justice Kennedy
declined to join Justice Stevens's plurality opinion on conspiracy. Instead,
Justice Kennedy highlighted the role of Congress, noting that, "Congress,
not the Court, is the branch in the better position to undertake the
'sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
national interest or with international justice."' 371
pdf. Sting operations are a legitimate law enforcement tactic, but they do not present
the logistical and evidentiary difficulties of prosecuting a member of Al Qaeda located
abroad. Prosecuting transnational terrorists in federal court is a complex enterprise
with many moving parts. See Jennifer Steinhauer & Charlie Savage, U.S. Defends
Prosecuting Benghazi Suspect in Civilian Rather than Military Court, N.Y. TIMES, June
18, 2014, at A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com2014/06/18/world/middleeast/
us-defends-prosecuting-benghazi-suspect-in-civilian-rather-than-military-court.htm
(noting the use of U.S. personnel abroad to capture Ahmed Abu Khattala, who was
subsequently arraigned in federal court in Washington, D.C. on charges of leading the
2012 attack on the U.S. diplomatic mission in Benghazi, Libya); see also In re Terrorist
Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Africa v. Odeh, 552 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 2008) (in
the course of upholding the convictions of the defendants on charges based on the
1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, court noted that one
defendant was arrested by Pakistani authorities, sent to Kenya, where he was
questioned by U.S. and Kenyan officials, and eventually transferred to U.S.). Because
of the challenges of prosecuting transnational terrorists, there have been relatively few
such cases in U.S. civilian courts. Indeed, Judge Tatel mentioned only two - the cases
cited above involving Benghazi and the East Africa embassy bombings. See Al Bahlul
II, 792 F.3d at 27. That number is roughly comparable to the number of military
commission prosecutions. Military commission cases are even more complex, because
they involve the additional dimension of occurrence during an armed conflict.
Military commission cases such as al Bahlul's and Article III trials are not mutually
exclusive; rather, they are complementary approaches to seeking accountability for
terrorists.
368 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
369 Id. at 599-601.
370 Id. at 601.
371 Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbarino, 367 U.S. 398, 428 (1964)).
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The reasonable relationship to international law test also provides
an effective limiting principle. Without this principle in place, the U.S.
could try individuals in the U.S. in military commissions for sedition,
as long as the government could show that such individuals were
belligerents. That would have allowed the government to use
commissions to try virtually all Confederate soldiers. This gambit
would have clashed with the spirit, if not the letter, of Article III's
reservation of treason prosecutions for the federal courts. The
reasonable relationship test would foreclose this kind of
overreaching. 372 It would also ensure that commissions could not try
defendants on charges more remote from international law, such as
373
providing material support in the form of funds to a terrorist group.

5. The Flaws in al Bahlul II's Rejection of the Functional Approach
In contrast with this functional analysis, the D.C. Circuit panel
striking down al Bahlul's conviction on Article III grounds took a
mechanical, formalistic view of both Supreme Court precedent and
Congress's power. Illustrating this formalist turn, neither Judge Rogers'
opinion nor Judge Tatel's concurrence addressed the undisputed facts
concerning al Bahlul's conduct, which the en banc D.C. Circuit had
described as "directly relate[d]" to the 9/11 attacks. 374 The panel
majority's failure to reckon with the facts of the case dovetailed with its
narrow view of Quirin, Hamdan, and Crowell v. Benson.
Discussing Quirin,Judge Rogers maintained that Chief Justice Stone
had not considered Congress's Article I powers in his analysis of the
Article III issue. 375 However, Judge Rogers' account of this section of
Chief Justice Stone's opinion failed to acknowledge the Chief Justice's
extended earlier discussion of Congress's war powers, and his
description of military commissions as "an important incident" of the

372 In this sense, the reasonable relationship test also improves on Judge
Kavanaugh's suggestion that Congress's power to prospectively designate charges to be
tried in commissions was not limited by the Define and Punish Clause at all, and
could be based on Congress's full range of war powers. See Hamdan v. United States,
696 F.3d 1238, 1246 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Judge Kavanaugh's approach would not
sufficiently restrain Congress.
373 See Margulies, Defining and Punishing, supra note 45, at 58-59 (noting that "acts
such as low-level financial support.., have never been considered violations of the
law of war").
374 Al Bahlul 1, 767 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
375 Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S.
1, 38-46 (1942)).
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conduct of armed conflict. 376 That aspect of Chief Justice Stone's
analysis was an integral building block for his treatment of Article III.
In addition, Judge Rogers ignored Chief Justice Stone's express
reluctance to rigidly demarcate the scope of Congress's authority
regarding military commissions. Chief Justice Stone's disavowal of the
need to use "meticulous care" in addressing that question 377 suggested
flexibility that the al Bahlul II majority failed to embrace. 378
Judge Rogers' opinion also leaned far too heavily on United States v.
Furlong,379 a piracy case with an idiosyncratic rationale.380 In Furlong,
the Court held that although Congress, exercising its power under the
Define and Punish Clause, could punish a robbery committed in the
course of a pirate ship's raid on another vessel, it could not punish a
murder committed in the course of that raid. Justice Johnson, writing
for the Furlong Court, labored mightily to explain why Congress could
not punish a murder committed in the course of piracy, while it could
punish a mere robbery committed under similar circumstances.
Justifying this peculiar result, Justice Johnson asserted that
international law punished robbery on the high seas as piracy, since
preying on international trade injured all nations. 381 The absence of an
international norm against piracy might have permitted piracy to
proceed with impunity, since the particular nation victimized by a
specific act of piracy might lack the motivation or the resources to
pursue the wrongdoer. Making robbery on the high seas an
international law offense and establishing universal jurisdiction over
38 2
prosecutions would close this gap.

This portion of Justice Johnson's explanation is unimpeachable.
However, Justice Johnson went off course, at least by today's

376

Quiin, 317 U.S. at 28.

377 Id. at 45-46.
378 Indeed, the willingness of Chief Justice Stone, Justice Frankfurter, and the rest
of the Quirin Court to overlook the President's lack of compliance with the literal
terms of the Articles of War regarding the Quirin defendants' appeal demonstrates a
flexibility and capaciousness that contrasts with the al Bahlul panel's parsimonious
reading of Congress's power. See supra notes 293-97 and accompanying text.
President Roosevelt had reviewed the verdict directly, instead of first allowing review
by the Judge Advocate General, as the Articles of War appeared to require.
379 United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184 (1820).
380 See Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 15-16; see also Margulies, Defining and Punishing,
supra note 45, at 69-70.
381 Furlong, 18 U.S. at 197 (noting that robbery on the high seas "is against all, and
punished by all").
382 Id. (noting that "robbery on the high seas is considered as an offence within the
criminal jurisdiction of all nations").
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standards, in arguing that an international law norm was not needed
to hold accountable individuals who committed murder in the course
of a pirate raid. According to Justice Johnson, murder was so
"abhorrent" that any state whose nationals were victimized would opt
to prosecute the offense under its own law. 38 3 This convoluted

rationale clashes with current understandings of the basis for
international prohibitions on war crimes, such as the murder of
civilians. The modern understanding is that such offenses are
punishable by international tribunals precisely because they are
regarded as especially heinous. 384 While Furlong stands for the truism
that Congress's power is not unlimited, the decision's idiosyncratic
and obsolete rationale reduces its value as a guide to the contours of
Congress's authority.
In determining the degree of deference due Congress's exercise of its
authority under the Define and Punish Clause, the al Bahlul panel
majority would have been better served by relying on United States v.
Arjona.385 In Arjona, as noted above, the Court deferred to Congress's
exercise of its power under the Define and Punish Clause to
criminalize the manufacturing of counterfeit foreign currencies within
the United States. Justifying its deference, the Court relied solely on a
policy rationale: counterfeiting foreign currencies undermined the
integrity of the international financial system. 38 6 The Arjona Court
deferred readily to Congress, despite the absence of any international
treaty or scholarship classifying transnational counterfeiting as a
violation of the law of nations.3 87 Although, as Judge Rogers noted in
her opinion, 388 the Arjona Court acknowledged that Congress's power
had limits, 389 the Court's reference to limits was a passing nod that did

not alter Arjona's deferential stance. The al Bahlul II court should have
taken Arjona's deference as its lodestar, instead of micromanaging
legislative judgments about foreign affairs and national security.
383

Id.

384 Margulies, Defining and Punishing, supra note 45, at 69-70; see Eugene

Kontorovich, The Piracy Analogy: Modern Universal Jurisdiction's Hollow Foundation,
45 HARV. INT'L LJ. 183, 230-36 (2004) (explaining and critiquing the development of
international law).
385 United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887); see also Margulies, Defining and
Punishing, supra note 45, at 47 (discussing Arjona); supra notes 274-76 (also
discussing Arjona).
386 Arjona, 120 U.S. at 484 (citing Vattel on the need for "wise and equitable
commercial laws").
387 See Lee & Sloss, supra note 275, at 147-48.
388 Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d 1, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
389 See Arjona, 120 U.S. at 488.
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The al Bahlul II court's grudging treatment of Congress's power was
most salient in its assertion, offered with no support whatsoever, that
no deference was due Congress unless the legislature specifically
articulated its intent to codify the law of nations. 390 Apparently,
according to the al Bahlul II majority, Congress cannot merely legislate
pursuant to the Define and Punish Clause. Instead, to be worthy of
deference, Congress must add a magical incantation to satisfy its
judicial overseers. Judge Henderson, in her perceptive dissent,
described the majority as requiring that Congress ask, "Mother, may
391
I?,"
before legislating with the full breadth of its Article I powers.392
Forcing Congress to jump through such hoops seems inappropriate
for a measure that the Quirin Court described as an "important
incident" of the conduct of war. As Judge Henderson made clear,
deference to Congress was the wiser course.
Judge Henderson was also insightful in noting the al Bahlul II
majority's misbegotten reliance on the Supreme Court's landmark
decision in Crowell v. Benson.393 In Crowell, the Court upheld an
administrative agency's adjudication of a dispute and determination of
facts, subject to deferential judicial review of agency fact-finding and
review of legal questions. 394 While the al Bahlul II majority suggested
that the MCA provided for less robust appellate review than the
regime at issue in Crowell,395 Judge Henderson accurately observed
that the review contemplated by the MCA was at least equal to the
review that the Supreme Court upheld in Crowell.396 The MCA
provides for de novo appellate review of legal questions, including the
sufficiency of the evidence. 397 In military commission cases, members
of the commission make specific findings of fact. 398 If those findings
were wholly unsupported by evidence in the record, a reviewing court
could vacate the conviction. In practice, therefore, there is little
daylight between appellate review under the MCA and the review

390 Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 16.
391 Id. at 49.
392 Id. at 51-52 (citing Arjona, 120 U.S. at 488 (contending that there was no
greater need for clear statement by Congress in military commission context than in
enactment of ordinary criminal law, as in Arjona)).
393 Id. at 66 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54 (1932)).
394 Crowell, 285 U.S. at 56-58.
395 Al Bahlul II, 792 F.3d at 20.
396 Id. at 66 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
397 Military Commissions Act, 10 U.S.C. § 950g(d) (2012).
398 See Al Bahlul 1,767 F.3d 1, 22. (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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contemplated by Crowell. Here, too, the al Bahlul II majority relied on
a tendentious reading of relevant precedent.
Judge Henderson's dissent, like Judge Brown's concurrence in al
Bahlul I, provides a far more convincing account of Congress's power.
Tracking the functional conception, Judge Henderson discussed the
importance of deference to Congress on the definition of international
law. 399 Judge Henderson also noted the practical national security
concerns, including the risk of disclosure of sensitive national security
information, that impelled Congress to provide for military
commissions. 400 In addition, Judge Henderson cited the limiting
principle in al Bahlul that precluded any wholesale congressional
takeover of Article III courts. Prosecutions based on a plot to commit a
clear international war crime such as the murder of civilians, Judge
Henderson observed, 40 1 add only a "narrow class of claims" to
"unchallenged" commission jurisdiction over charges arising from
completed war crimes. 40 2 In short, Judge Henderson's dissent addressed
the interaction of Article I and Article III in a fashion that furnished a
workable template for future developments in the law. Orderly
development that respects Congress's prerogatives while cabining the
risk of abuse achieves the key goals of the functional conception.
CONCLUSION

If, as then Justice Rehnquist suggested over thirty years ago, one
could view the jurisprudence of non-Article III tribunals as a bleak and
unforgiving expanse where "ignorant armies have clashed by night,"
military tribunals have been a perennial battlefield. The protective camp
has fought hard to keep Article III courts off the slippery slope where a
small slide could lead to disaster. Functionalists have fought back,
rejecting the formalism of the protective camp's position.
The contest over military tribunals illustrates the high stakes in this
debate. If the protective camp prevails, an avowed terrorist like Ali
Hamza al Bahlul may escape accountability, and civilian contractors
with U.S. forces abroad may experience fewer constraints. On the
other hand, if the functionalist camp emerges victorious, officials may

399 Al Bahlul I1, 792 F.3d at 45-46 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
400 Id. at 67-68.
401 See id. at 67 (observing that military commission trials involving conspiracies to
commit internationally recognized war crimes "'deal only with a particularized area of
law"' (citing Schor, 478 U.S. at 852)).
402 Id. at 67 (citing Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1945

(2015)).
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turn to non-Article III tribunals as a quick and easy answer, making
the gold standard of Article III seem like a luxury we can no longer
afford. Each scenario has its risks.
Despite the attractiveness of the protective camp's vision, this
Article has argued that the functionalists have the better case. In part
this conclusion is the verdict of history, in two senses. First, as Justice
Rehnquist acknowledged in his Northern Pipeline concurrence, we
have found it impossible to maintain unquestioning allegiance to
Article III's strictures. Territorial courts have become part of our
system, even though a territory like Puerto Rico shows that Article III
courts can take root. Courts-martial have followed suit. Public rights
doctrine has grown, although no one seems to know exactly what it is.
History also favors the functionalists in the domain of military
tribunals. The protective camp has substituted a stark narrative of
military rule for the complexities of the historical record. The absolutism
of the protective camp's foremost champion, Justice Black, served him
well during the Cold War's challenges to free speech. However, it was
less useful in navigating the nuances of Article Ill. In particular, Justice
Black's refusal to acknowledge the pivot in English constitutional history
toward military justice as a means to secure civilian control cast a pall on
the protective camp's analysis of these issues.
Fearful of the slippery slope, the protective camp fails to recognize
that although the not-so-tidy examples of territorial courts, military
justice, and public rights do not provide all of the answers, they do
help point us toward the right questions. Considering unifying
themes, functionalists can derive three crucial elements that support
non-Article III tribunals: (1) the importance of the tribunal to
Congress's exercise of Article I power; (2) the promotion of other
structural values, such as civilian control of the military; and, (3) the
presence of a limiting principle. Applying these elements leads to the
conclusion that courts-martial can try civilian contractors, while
military commissions can hear charges with a reasonable relationship
to international law brought against belligerents in an armed conflict.
Members of the protective camp will view each proceeding as a
treacherous first step down the slippery slope. However, the functional
position will appeal to those of practical bent who view the world's
exigencies as too intractable for Article III courts' formal combat. Of
course, informality also has its limits. Due process is a meaningful
constraint on any adjudicative enterprise under the Constitution,
whether that enterprise is military or civilian in character. Following
the functionalists' lead merely creates an opportunity for adjudication
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that is both fair and efficient. Both within and beyond Article III
tribunals, realizing that opportunity is the most formidable challenge.

